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This time of the year, there is always a sight to see. The school leavers put on their robes, 
carry the photographic outfit, and flash every comer of the campus where they have spent 
the most precious time of their life. A would-be graduate myself, I am not one of them, 
though. Every now and then, when I walked around the campus and saw young faces 
display their happy and youthful smiles in front of the camera, I would slow down my steps, 
watching them and waiting for the outburst of laughter after a fleeting stasis when this 
sweet and peaceful memory left its mark on a photo. 
Memory. I remember the each day that I toiled in my small office I shared with my office 
brother Tiaii Lei, a law student who by a twist of fate ended up being a Ph.D candidate of 
political science. Most of the time, he worked in dormitory, but once he paid little visits to 
the office, we would find ourselves engaged in conversations on a wide range of topics, 
from academics to childhood anecdotes to almost everything. 
Downstairs from my office, a group of bachelor graduates were gathering on the lawn of 
the United College in preparation for their photos. This was an assorted collection of 
students from different academic backgrounds and colleges. Among them, there was this 
girl from Shaw College who used to be in one of my tutorials, Anne. For the last twelve 
months leading to my submission of this thesis, Anne has been the one that cheered me up 
throughout the working nights. After midnight, we would find ourselves walking back to 
the dormitory on the quiet alleys of the campus, dimly illuminated by the soft road lights. 
That moment, I felt in my heart a sense of eternity. 
Memory is where one could see about yourself, about the deepest part in your heart, 
untouched by the whirlpool of real life. 
Opposite to my office are the offices of Professor Li and Professor Wu. Professor Li 
extended to me his unfailing support that guided me throughout the whole process of my 
thesis writing. His sharing of his perspective and the past experience as a student not only 
encouraged me at time of setbacks but also inspired me of the wisdom of life. Without him, 
I would not have been able to Professor Wu, the youngest professor I have ever seen, has 
been extremely supportive. I'd like to thank them for all that they have done to me. 
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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Chinese Labor Regime in the Context of Corporate Social Responsibility: The Experience 
of A Social Organization 
Submitted by: Wang Jing 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong (July 2007) 
The thesis features a research that attempts to unravel the evolutionary process 
of the Chinese labor regime by looking at a social organization in its interaction 
with the state, the trade unions, the foreign NGOs, and the corporate sector in 
the context of corporate social responsibility. The research is aimed to 
comprehend the dynamics underlying the change that has been gradually 
taking place in the state-society relations for the years since the Tiananmen 
tragic incident. The research places its focus on a case study of a single social 
organization that has developed into a successful non-government organization 
that helps improve the workplace labor practice in many export-oriented 
enterprises in South China. By breaking down the development trajectory of 
that migrant work social organization, the research tries to find the pushes and 
the pulls that facilitate and inhibit its growth, thus identifying the key variables 
that figure in its development. 
This research finds that the role of intellectual-turned social entrepreneur and 
the presence of political risk reduction factor exemplified by the ideology of 
corporate social responsibility turn out to be critical in the development of 
marginalized interest social organizations and the gradualist evolvement of 
labor regime and civil society. The findings lead to a refinement of the 
theoretical framework that could help explain the changes that have taken 
















Chapter One: Introduction 
A. Background leading to the research question 
One week after the 2005 Spring Festival, while many Chinese went back to work with all 
the best hopes they have for the coming new year, many plant owners in the South China 
were pacing up and down in their offices, grimace of anxiety on the face. It is not easy to 
make sense of this scene, given that the booming China's economy had resulted in 
exponentially growing number of orders for products of their business. But a glimpse of the 
huge job vacancy posters attached to the front gate of their plants might shed light to the 
trouble they was running into: many of their workers did not turn up after their vacation 
leave. Belong long, the plant owners began to fully realize the gravity of the situation, as 
the extensive media coverage revealed that this turned out to be a generic problem that 
plagued the plants situated in the South China. Ever since, the labor shortage, like an 
infectious disease, has spread across the provincial borders into other coastal areas. Fujian, 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu Province were all affected, and its impacts linger even to this day. 
As abruptly as the emergency manifested itself, plant owners knew only too well about the 
reason that accounted for its occurrence. For years, the China's export-orientated industry 
has been to blame for the abject plight of the working class. Unlike the workers who used 
to work in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the working class here is referred mainly to the 
peasant-turned migrant laborers that have gradually loom into the scene of China's 
economic development since the 1980s. Its emergence and fast growth have essentially 
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changed the composition of the working class as a whole. From being the initial regional 
social phenomenon, it has expanded into a nationwide demographic mobility since the 
early 1990s. With most of former SOE workers reaching their retirement age now, the 
peasant-turned migrant laborers are taking the place of them as the pillar of the working 
class. In contrast to their dominant number, however, these migrant laborers constitute a 
distinctive social group marked by its impoverishment and misery, an immediate 
consequence of the booming of export-orientated industry in China logic unclear. Tethered 
to the global supply chain, export-orientated enterprises are plunged into the relentless 
pursuit of price competitiveness, which frequently translates into highly exploitative labor 
practice in factories, such as long working hours, low wages and poor working conditions, 
to name but a few. Many enterprises even go so far as to delay wage payment and default 
oil wage dues in order to squeeze out the last bit of profit margin. 
The dire situation of Chinese migrant workers is a product of the institutional failure of 
China's labor regime and a government friendly to the development of export-orientated 
industry in its drive for economic development. While the former finds its origin in the 
revolutionary years prior to the reform, the latter seems to be perpetuating that failure far 
into the post-Mao era. 
I. The socialist legacy: the institutional failure of China's labor regime� 
Structured after the Soviet model, China duplicated the feature of state domination in its 
‘Labor regime is a frequently-used but seldom carefully defined term. Labor regime referred to in this thesis is the 
macro-level institutional arrangement that distributes powers among key players in the industrial relations, such as state, 
trade unions and employers' organizations. So, in contrast to the micro-level approach in industrial relation methods 
which examines the workplace-based employment relations and labor process, the thesis places its focus on the 
framework of relationships between societal institutions. We are coming back to the definition of this term in Chapter 2. 
8 
socialist labor regime. With the state taking up the enterprise management and creating an 
official trade union, the state sought to bring into its purview the resolution of industrial 
conflicts, if any. The state held the belief that the state's presence in both the management 
and union would achieve a power balance between them. To some extent, this is what Fox 
referred to as the unitary model of industrial relations where industrial conflicts were 
assumed not to exist in the first place. The model, however, proved to be falling short of 
the expectation and highly intractable in operation due to the false assumption on which the 
model was based. It turned out that the state's fundamental drive for economic 
modernization frequently tilted the balance in favor of the management versus the workers, 
leading to frequent workplace conflicts that, in several cases, escalated into wide scale 
industrial chaos. ^ An immediate consequence of the problematic labor regime is that it 
paralyzed the official trade unions as a guardian of workers' interests. More often than not, 
unions were found to be captured by the management under the aegis of the state, 
completely deprived of its legal responsibility for the workers. 
The incapability of the unions to protect workers persists into the reform era, when the state 
granted SOE management greater autonomy and other types of ownership of enterprises 
were allowed to carry out their profit-seeking venture in the market by which the state 
attempted to gradually replace the plan. The imperative to contain the industrial conflict for 
the sake of the developmentalist strategy requires the state to maintain its domination in the 
industrial relations. The form of this domination might have changed, but its essence 
remained in the reform era. So, trade unions, still a part of the state, continue to suffer from 
2 See Allen Fox, Industriol Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology, in John Child (ed.), Man and Organization 
(Allen & Unwin, 1973) 
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the institutional contradiction as much as they did back in the Mao's China. The trade 
unions are powerless in their representation of the workers in the market where industrial 
conflicts can no longer be readily assumed away. For many, unions' existence is simply a 
political formality. 
Moreover, the reform that gave local states a free hand in boosting up the economy has 
bred a collusion of local governments with export-orientated enterprises which contribute 
to the fast growth of local GDP, a measurement that figures tremendously in the 
performance appraisal of the local governments' officials."^ To attract foreign investment, 
the local states are turning a blind eye on enterprises' aberrant conducts that are massively 
in violation of labor law. The governments have merely been paying lip service to the 
protection of labor interest. However, recent years have witnessed a change in the 
industrial relations that indicates a possibility of a gradualist process where the state 
domination begins to diminish, and this process might be unfolding in the civil society as a 
whole. 
11. Society in action: the emergence ofNGOs working for migrant workers^ 
The inaction of local states to deal with the deterioration of workers' social conditions, 
however, has prompted continual spontaneous social initiatives. Informal though most of 
them were in the early stage, many have gradually taken on evident organizational features. 
Some successful cases can be dated back to the mid-1990s, when they pioneered to make 
3 See Elizabeth Perry, Shanghai's Strike Wave of 1957, China Quarterly, No. 137. (Mar., 1994), pp. 1-27 
4 In the China's politics, it would be necessary to differentiate the state into levels, as the central state and local states are 
hardly a monolithic whole. Instead, their interests differ and sometimes even contradict. See Linda Li, Centre and 
Provinces-China 1978-1993: Power as Non-zew-sum, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 
5 In this thesis, NGOs working for migrant workers are construed as the social organizations that, based on spontaneous 
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an effort in the form of social organizations with a view to taking care of the migrant 
workers' interests that were then almost completely ignored by the governments. 6 Many 
of these organizations refer to their activities as the provision of services to the workers, 
though the state views some services not as service proper but as a subversive conspiracy 
of organizing workers to challenge the state or disrupt the economy. 
Generally speaking, two types of such organizations have prevailed in this emerging field 
of service provision for migrant workers. First, there are self-help mutual groups that were 
organized by migrant workers themselves. Within this type, many initiatives remain 
informal and underground, and may provide their services solely to a small group of 
workers. They are believed to dominate in number/ but at the same time, to suffer from 
instability due to the financial constraints and government's monitoring. However, some 
have developed into successes. Among others, Panyu Migrant Worker Document Service 
Department {Panyu Dagongzu Wenshu Chuli Fuwubu) is a case in point. An NGO based in 
Panyu, Guangdong Province, the Service Department was initiated in 1998 by a migrant 
worker with the assistance of a lawyer. It specializes in legal consulting services for 
workers. Within this category also finds the Folks Home (Nongyou Zhijia) based in Beijing. 
Established on the initiatives of several migrant workers in 2002, Folks Home focused 
initially on the amenity services for migrant workers but later expanded into mnning a 
initiatives, serve the migrant worker in the area of welfare provision and labor rights protection. 
6 Social organization is used in the thesis as an equivalent term to non-governmental organization (NGOs). But this 
equivalence is qualified, because social organizations in China usually have an official background, an imprint left by the 
registration process So, strictly speaking, these social organizations are not NGOs, but it would be unnecessary to 
overemphasize this differentiation, since some social organizations, though organizationally attached to state agencies, 
are, in fact, initiated by spontaneous social actors and orientated to serving its targeted people. They are not different from 
their western counterparts in what they do. This organizational peculiarity is merely reflective of the transitional nature of 
the civil society development in China. A further discussion on the nature of China's civil society will be made in Chapter 
2. 
7 The actual number of this type of social organizations is hard to estimate, but my interviews with the field labor social 
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series of services ranging from occupational training to legal consulting services. Second, 
there are social organizations that were established by other entities and non-worker 
individuals such as intellectuals. Home to Maiden Workers (Dagongmei Zhijia) in Beijing 
falls into this category. Established in 1996, the organization was a collaborative effort of 
Hong Kong Oxfam and Nanshan District official trade unions. The presence of 
government in this case, however, does not disqualify it as an example of spontaneous 
social initiatives, in that Oxfam has been taking the lead in initiating the cooperation based 
on personal relations with the union official. However, both worker- and outsider-initiated 
NGOs may have distinct target groups, some focusing on maiden workers while others 
providing services available to all. Though these social initiatives take different forms to 
suit their specific agenda regarding migrant workers, common to all is their ultimate 
ambition to bridge the social gap caused by the alienation of the migrant workers in the 
market reform. 
These social initiatives, given their voluntariness, smack of what is, for a while, a focus of 
academic interest: the third sector. The third sector is a realm of informal 
groups—associations, clubs, or NGOs (non-governmental organizations). It is "a massive 
array of self-governing private organizations, not dedicated to distributing profits to 
shareholders or directors, pursuing public purposes outside the formal apparatus of the 
stae，，.8 It derives its name from its role in a triad, where the first is the state, the second is 
the private sector of businesses and enterprises, and the third is the realm of citizens' 
initiatives. In some ways, the third sector is a functionalist synonym to civil society and 
activist have confirmed this conjecture. 
8 Lester M. Salamon and Helmut.K. Anheier, The Emergence of Non-profit Sector: An Overview, (Manchester: 
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embedded in the post-war western history. It is a conceptualization of western experience 
of its disillusionment with welfare state and their subsequent e c l i p s e . 9 The enormous 
public finance coupled with the ineffective bureaucracy rendered the welfare state 
vulnerable to impacts of economic crisis. As problems deepened, awareness of the 
limitation of the traditional public and private sectors grew. Against this background, the 
third sector arose as a result of the search for a type of economic organizations capable of 
picking up the burden that the gasping welfare state could no longer carry and that the 
profit-seeking private sector was not supposed to shoulder. So, the third sector is a 
reinvigoration of the civil society, a term derived from medieval European history in the 
context of modern society. 
With a different political context, the China in the reform, however, confronts similar 
problems. The retreating role of the state in the economy had eroded its traditional 
capability of administering large-scale welfare programs. In urban areas, the massive 
marketization restructuring of SOEs shook the very foundation of the urban welfare system, 
because it was nested in the SOE-based planned economy. In the same vein, the 
disintegration of rural collectives dealt a deadly blow to the rural welfare programs. On a 
national level, a vacuum was forming in the social welfare, which presents a major 
incentive to the state to turn to the society for solutions. But this would not have been 
possible without the growing market that not only released the vigor in the society that had 
been subject to suppression for several decades, but also provided the space for maneuver. 
Manchester University Press, 1996) 
9 See Helmut K. Anheier and Wolfgang Seibel, The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organizations, 
(Berlin ； New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990); also see Lester M. Salamon and Helmut.K. Anheier, The Emergence of 
Non-profit Sector: An Oven'iew, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996); K.M. Brown., S Kenny, and B.S. 
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In consequence, the phenomenal growth of third sector has become a notable feature of 
China's transitional society after the adoption of market reform. In the 1980s, an explosion 
took place in the development of social organizations, reaching a peak immediately before 
1989. Since reform started, the number of national social organizations amounted up to 
1,600 in 1989, registering a yearly growth rate at 28% for a whole d e c a d e • � The number of 
local social organizations witnessed a far more enormous increase from several thousands 
at the end of the 1970s to more than 200,000 as of 1989." Though the Tiananmen Tragedy 
and the Democratic Party Incident'^ triggered two rounds of purge, it did not dampen the 
enthusiasm of the society to revitalize itself. 
The social organization working for migrant workers is part of this whole development of 
third sector or in a broad sense, the civil society in China. Since the welfare needs of 
migrant workers confront a shortfall in supply on the part of the state in terms of basic 
medicare, pension and children's education, e tc ," there is a strong incentive for the social 
forces to step in. However, a quality that marks this type of social organizations from the 
ones in the field of welfare provision such as care-homes for old people is their pronounced 
connotation of labor rights advocacy and campaigns.‘斗 The massively inhuman labor 
practice in China's enterprises encroaches on labor's economic rights such as right to pay 
for their labor, right to compensation for occupational injuries and right to working in a 
Turner, A Basis for Associations? The Role ofTthird Sector Welfare Organizations, Community, Work and Family, 2002， 
5: 2, pp. 159-180. 
Yu Kepiiig, The Emergence of Chinese Civil Society and a Shift in Governance, in Governance and Good Governance, 
(Social Sciences Bibliography Press, 2000) 
丨丨Dito. 
12 See Tony Saich, Negotiating the State: the Development of Social Organizations in China, China Quarterly, No. 161’ 
Mar.，2000，pp.124-141. 
See Linda Wong, China Urban Migrants: the Public Policy Challenge, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3. (Autumn, 
1994), pp. 335-355 
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healthy work environment, etc, and it also questions the legitimacy of the state in depriving 
workers of their political right, which, in the context of China, points unequivocally to the 
right to have independent trade unions. Of course, poorly educated, they may not 
understand their situation in terms of rights, but this is far from being an obstacle for them 
to know that they are treated unfairly and to gradually leam to struggle for what they think 
they deserve. Unfortunately, this connotation of struggling for rights inherent in the 
development of the social organization working for migrant workers is the Damocles' 
sword hanging over the head of the party state and civil society itself. The reason is 
self-evident. The party's developmeiitalist strategy for the economic modernization sit 
completely on the exploitation of the working class whose tendency to organize themselves 
by virtue of the emerging civil society jeopardizes exactly the feasibility of this strategy. 
In fact, the development of the migrant worker social organizations is intertwined with the 
state in a cross-dilemma. On the one hand, the disadvantaged labor poses to the party a 
serious question of social stability, so an inexpensive risk-reducing governance mode will 
be very likely to enlist social forces as a possible solution; on the other hand, the 
connotation of a growing civil society associated with active social forces remains to be a 
concern for the state. This state mindset leaves in limbo the policies regarding the social 
organizations, and presents an obstacle that curbs their growth. 
However, into 2000s, an emerging global movement of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) has become a significant parameter that adds to the context of state cross-dilemma 
14 See Linda Wong and Tang Jun, Non-State Care Homes for Older People as Third Sector Organizations in China 's 
Transitional Welfare Economy, Journal of Social Policy, 35，2, pp.229-246. 
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and impacts the development of social organizations working to protect migrant workers. 
Corporate social responsibility is a multi-dimensionl corporate obligation that requires the 
corporations to attend to their social responsibilities at the same time of their profit making 
activities. Among others, labor practice presents an important aspect of CSR that charges 
the corporations with the responsibility to improve and maintain decent labor workplace 
practices. In China, corporate social responsibility has already been practiced by many 
multinational corporations that invest in China or have their supply chain in China, 
especially along the South China coastline where concentrates export-oriented 
manufacturing enterprises. 
This contextual change in the China's industrial relations is having its effect on the social 
organizations that aim to improve the labor conditions. The presence of CSR is reshaping 
the development trajectory of social organization and redefining the actual boundary 
within which they keep their strategic flexibility in choice of their organizational methods 
and action areas. 
B. Research Question 
The thesis attempts to understand the evolutionary process of China's NGO sector for 
migrant workers in the context of CSR, to analyze how they carved out a niche for 
themselves in the industrial relations and how the aforementioned cross-dilemma, 
interacting with the emerging CSR practices, affects the development trajectory of the 
organization. The findings of this research will help answer the following questions: 
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(1) What is the path that the social organization takes to enter the field of industrial 
relations? 
(2) What are the major factors that account for the twists on the development trajectory of 
the organization? 
(3) What is the strategy, if any, that the social organization takes to hedge the political risk 
in their operation? 
(4) What are the effects that the organizational structure has on the operation of the 
organization? 
(5) In what way does the characteristic of the leadership of the organization affect the 
development of the organization? 
(6) What factors determine the choice of services that the organization provides? 
These questions may look a little discursive at first glance, covering different issues related 
to the social organizations active in the industrial relations. But in fact, they are derived 
from two broad categories of questions that, combined together, will detail out a 
description of the organization's evolutionary process in its interaction with the state in the 
context of CSR. The first category of questions includes Question one and two, and the rest 
belongs to the second category. 
The first two questions follow a temporal sequence of the life circle of a social organization. 
The first question places its focus on the organization's entry into the field while the second 
concentrates on its actual operation after its entry. The entry phase of the organization has a 
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particularly crucial bearing on the later development of the organization. For this research, 
the value of studying this entry phase, however, goes beyond that. The fact that the 
organization has to register with the government renders this entry phase an extremely 
interesting area to analyze the interactions that are going back and forth between the 
government and the organization. Similarly, the twists that take place along the trajectory 
of the organization's development, which is the focus of the second question, are also very 
informative about the interaction in which this research is interested. 
The second category includes question three to six. They are logically nestled in the first 
category of questions in that they hypothesize the relevance of some factors in shaping the 
evolutionary process of the social organization working to protect migrant workers. So, the 
factors mentioned in this set of questions are not necessarily the only ones affecting the 
evolutionary process, and just as certain it is that these factors must be considered, other 
relevant factors will come to the surface that might prove more important than any of those 
mentioned the second category of questions. Nevertheless, the necessity of listing these 
initial factors thought of being relevant is not at all voided, since they presents a very 
helpful starting point to focus the research at the early state and may later lead to the 
discovery of other relevant factors. 
C. Significance of the research 
State-society relations have always been among the key socio-political aspects that figure 
in the transitional politics. The collapse of communist regimes in the Eastern Europe has 
18 
triggered a wave of social science researches on the changing state-society relations. 
Papers and books have piled up in a common effort to grasp the profundity of this great 
transformation where the society had broken the shackles of the state and fought its 
autonomy back. In Poland, the Solidarity survived the repression of the communist 
government and successfully forced the latter to negotiation roundtable that led to a 
semi-free election in 1989.15 In Romania, the people rallied themselves around riots in 
1989 that overthrew the autarchic government of Nicolae Ceau§escu who was sentenced to 
death together with his wife, E l e n a . I n Soviet Unions, fully aware of the riots surging all 
over the country had so aggravated that the government was no longer able to contain its 
deterioration, Gorbachev announced the disintegration of this first communist state in the 
world, the glory for several g e n e r a t i o n s . 口 These dramatic changes culminated in a drastic 
redefinition of the state-society relations in East Europe. The totalitarian states that had 
stretched its antenna to every comer of the society ultimately capitulated to the latter and 
retreated from much of the social space over which they used to have control. 
Interestingly, in this tumultuous transition that unfolded in East Europe, the industrial 
workers had been playing a dominant role throughout. The Polish Solidarity certainly 
stands out as a classic piece of history showing how the ferment in the industrial relations 
1 o ^ ^ 
stirred up a society that could stand up against the state. The effect of subsequent collapse 
of Polish state-dominated labor regime spilled over to other aspects of the society through 
See Michael H. Bernhard, The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics 
(Columbia University Press, 1993) 
"‘‘See Nestor Ratesh, Romania: the Entangled Revolution, (Greenword Publishing Group, 1991) 
17 See Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother, Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov, What about the workers?: Workers and the 
Transition to Capitalism in Russia (Verso Press, 1993) 
Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-class Democratization (Princeton 
University Press, 1991) 
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the democratization of the political system, an ultimate end-result of the anti-communist 
social movement led by the independent unionists. So, industrial relations are a key 
element to the state-society relations. 
The East European experience of activist labor found its effect on Chinese government's 
attitude towards spontaneous social initiatives regarding the workers. Though China's 
authoritarian regime did not follow the suit of its east European counterparts, its gradualist 
economic reform still subjected state-society relations to adjustment. However, the state's 
attitude towards the spontaneous associational activities is markedly ambivalent, and its 
support rather selective. Social initiatives that specialize in urban welfare provision are 
welcomed by the state. For example, old-age care centers have experienced a fast growth in 
the last decades and their legal status is recognized by the state. ^ ^ In contrast, associational 
activities of migrant workers are strictly constrained by the state in their development. 
Their registration process is complicated, their operation closely monitored by the 
government, and their development and expansion inhibited. Among others, social 
organizations working to protect labor bear the brunt of the hostility of the state to the civil 
society. 
The state's hostility, but not complete prohibition of, the spontaneous associational 
activities regarding migrant workers in the industrial relations results in the uniqueness in 
the evolution of the state-society relations. Unlike in the East Europe where the 
independent worker organizations were engaged in provocative challenge against the state, 
See Linda Wong and Tang Jun, Non-State Care Homes for Older People as Third Sector Organizations in China's 
Transitional Welfare Economy, Journal of Social Policy, 35’ 2’ pp.229-246. 
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the migrant worker organization in China takes an innovative and flexible path in their 
cause. Their development in adversity represents a different approach of changing 
state-society relations in a transitional society. A good understanding of this process will 
not only improve on the theorization of state-society relations in transitional society, but 
also throw light on the labor regime transition in China. 
D. Research Structure 
The research focuses on the relations between the social organization and the state in the 
context of CSR. But obviously, it would be empirically impossible to confine the research 
to the study of this relation, because the social organization that works for migrant workers 
is enmeshed in a network comprised not only of the government and official unions, but of 
enterprises and fund donors as well, and in this research, it reveals how important the role 
that multinational corporations (MNCs) and western civil society impinges upon the actual 
transitional process. All the interactions that the social organization engages with those 
players will affect its relations with the state and leaves a mark in its development 
trajectory. Notwithstanding, the multiple relations involved in the development of social 
organization does not nullify the status of its relations with the government as the main 
focus of this research, which is dedicated to the analysis of the changing state-society 
relations mirrored in the transition in the labor regime. 
This research identifies the three major relations of social organizations with other entities 
in the industrial relations, the effect of which is believed to be substantive on its relation 
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with the state. They are official trade unions, enterprises, and foreign NGOs. 
I. Relationship with official trade unions 
Though official unions are in essence a part of the party state, it is necessary to separate it 
from the state in the discussion. The reasons are threefold. First, the state-dominated labor 
regime causes the official union to straddle between the state and the workers. Simply put, 
the official unions are state mandated organization - whose officials are also appointed by 
the state - to represent the interests of the workers. This institutional design tends to breed 
a nebulous relation of official unions with either the state or the working class which, in 
turn, creates variance in union's attitudes towards the workers across regions, and this will 
impact the development of the social organization. Second, as a monopolistic organization 
representing workers' interests, the official trade unions benefit the most from its parasite 
relationship with the state for the resources that migrant worker social organizations 
usually do not have. This presents an optional approach in social organization's 
development, that is, to collaborate with the unions in order to tap on its resources. Of 
course, this latter point is merely a hypothesis that will be subject to empirical tests, but it 
highlights the necessity of a separate discussion for this relation. 
II. Relationship with enterprises (suppliers and MNCs) 
Because of CSR, the relations with enterprises is supposed to figure signficantly in the 
development of social organizations working to protect migrant workers. Enterprises are at 
the forefront of the industrial relations. For social organizations that specialize in labor 
rights safeguarding, enterprises are one of the major flashpoints involving active 
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interactions between the two. However, given the context of CSR, the attitude of 
enterprises towards social organizations that aim to improve workplace standard might 
take on some changes. In fact, some social organizations have established partnership with 
enterprises, collaborating to enhance workplace labor standards. For social organizations, 
their cooperation with enterprises marks an accomplishment of what official unions could 
hardly achieve with their titular or subordinate status in the enterprises. However, this type 
of cooperation being possible has behind it a complicated set of motivations on the part of 
enterprises and the social organization, and thus warrants an in-depth analysis of this 
relation. 
The relation of social organization with the enterprises is particularly important in its effect 
oil the interaction between the former and the state. The presence of the social organization 
in the enterprises, which is made possible by CSR, facilitates its direct contact with 
workers. For the government, this amounts to a treacherous possibility of connecting 
workers between enterprises rallying around the social organization, a scenario that the 
state will try its best to prevent from materializing. In addition, the social organization's 
activities in the enterprises are likely to beget trade unions' hostility. Although workplace 
level trade unions, if any, almost make no impact on the management, they are legally 
attached to the local official trade union which, in nature, is an administrative part of the 
government. So long as the official trade unions are legally the only organization that 
represents the worker, they would be unhappy to see their role being replaced by other 
organizations. So, social organization's interaction with enterprises will definitely be 
reflected into its interactions with the government. 
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III. Relationship with foreign NGOs 
The global post-socialist NGO movement has played a significant role in fostering 
domestic social initiatives in many post-socialist countries. Spearheaded by wealthy NGOs 
(charitable funds, for example) based in the US and West Europe, the movement has 
channeled huge amount of funds into post-socialist countries such as Russia, Romania and 
Czech, to name just a few, in support of the growth of a local NGO sector. China's different 
political context does not block western donors from participating in engineering the 
development of local NGOs (social organizations) and funding programs either related or 
unrelated to the government. Furthermore, given the CSR, foreign NGOs has a possible 
justification to extend its presence in the industrial relations. 
These funds are of critical importance to the survival of migrant worker social 
organizations. Though the government does not explicitly prohibit international donors 
from funding local migrant worker social organizations, nor does it support it. The funding 
is a hazy area in the operation of the organizations and could involve huge political risk. So, 
the organization's interaction with the donor impinges directly on its relation with the state. 
F. The Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis has a total of seven chapters including this one as the introductory part of the 
thesis, which is followed by a chapter dedicated to an explanation of methodology. Chapter 
three is a literature review that systematically sums up the literatures on China's 
state-society relations as a framework to understand the transition in the Chinese labor 
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regime. Chapter Four to Chapter Six are the three main chapters in this thesis, which places 
the focus on a case study that this research features. The case is derived from the 
experience of an NGO based in Shenzhen working on labor right protection. Chapter Four 
explicates the background against which NGO of the kind as represented by the case 
surfaced in the arena of the industrial relations. Chapter Five analyzes the first two years 
(2002-2003) in this organization's history，focusing on the pathway that it took to 
overcome the bottleneck symptomatic of the initial stage of China's NGOs. Chapter Six 
picks up the third and fourth year (2004-2005) as the focus of analysis, to see how the 
organization adapted its strategy and how the changes relate to its first two years' operation. 
Chapter Seven summarizes the thesis by reverting back to some theoretical issues of 
state-society relations transition brought up by the analysis of case study. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
The China's economic reform, ever since it started, has given rise to much speculation on 
the direction of change in the industrial relations that would take place in response to the 
emerging market. The initial focus of academic interest was mainly on the impacts the 
marketization of SOEs had on the workplace employment relations.^® This was, in nature, a 
micro perspective^' of the industrial relations that examines a range of workplace-based 
employment issues and the operation of the labor process. Till recently, this perspective 
continues to add to the corpus of literatures of China's industrial relations, as the reform 
introduced new types of ownership and expedited the restructuring of SOEs. However, the 
discourse of civil society that arose at the turn of 1989 raised the academic attention to the 
macro perspective of industrial relations in an effort to comprehend the adjusting 
state-society relations.^^ 
This chapter is intended to present an integrated literature review on China's industrial 
relations as embedded in the state-society relations. This would be a synthesis of literatures 
in the two distinct, but closely related, academic fields, and such a synthesis is not a 
deliberate and meaningless piece-togethering, but required by the research question this 
thesis seeks to answer. Migrant worker social organizations have a functional identity in 
the industrial relations since it endeavors to promote workers' welfare and enhance labor 
See I. B. Helbum and John C. Shearer, Human Resources and Industrial relations in China: A Time of Ferment 
(Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 38, No . l , pp. 3-15, 1984) 
21 See Greg O'Leary (ed.)’ Adjusting to Capitalism: Chinese Workers and State, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe，1998); 
Malcolm Warner, Changing Workplace Relations in the Chinese Economy, (Basingstoke, Hampshire : Macmillan ； New 
York : St. Martin's Press, 2000); Fang Lee Cooke, HRM, work and employment in China, (London : New York ： 
Rout丨edge, 2005) 
22 For example, Anita Chan, Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China, The Australian 
26 
standards; but at the same time, it is a part of the growing civil society as distinguished 
from the state. Its emergence and evolution have implications for both the China's 
industrial relations and state-society relations in general. 
In the first part of this chapter, a major line of arguments with respect to China's transition 
in state-society relations will be summarized, and their merits and weakness weighed. In 
this part, I will attempt to justify the merit of the concept "civil society" as a desirable 
theoretical framework instead of much used corporatism in the explanation of China's 
transition in state-society relations. And also, I will affirm the state-in-society perspective 
as a necessary complement to the civil society model. The first part sets the context for the 
following literature review on China's labor regime transition, where I will show that the 
union-state relation approach to the study of labor regime transition is misguided by the 
theoretical emphasis on corporatism and also insufficient to explain the labor regime 
transition. Besides, I will stress the necessity of the dynamic perspective of strategic 
interaction in the study of labor regime transition. 
A. State-society relations: a Civil Society Perspective 
The topic of state-society relations is a popular pursuit of academics who could folly 
realize their theorizing capability by continual redefinition of concepts. Terms such as 
civil society, the third sector, civic society and social capital, etc proliferate in the 
discussions. Admittedly, these terms are not meaningless and academic ostentatious 
obfuscation that scares away laymen, since each of them represents a distinct facet of the 
Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.29, Jan. 1993, pp.31-61 
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same prism. For instance, civic society places the emphasis on the fact that 'the virtue of 
civil society is the readiness to moderate particular, individual or parochial interests and to 
give the precedence to the common good', ^^  while social capital is the desirable effect on 
the formation of interpersonal trust brought by civil society that facilitates coordination 
and cooperation for mutual benefit. 24 But the terminological diversity does cause 
confusions and obscure the essence of what they point commonly to, that is, a sphere of 
free social interaction and organization separate from and independent of the state. 
The heated discussion of a rising civil society in China, however, was intertwined with the 
resurrection of this concept in the western academia. Prompted by differing political 
exigency, the scholarly search for solutions to the social and political crisis finally came to 
recognize the same remedy. In Europe, John Keane, preoccupied with the tendency of 
centralization in European socialism, suggested defending the distinction between state 
and the civil society in order to democratize its socialism.^^ Across the Atlantic Ocean, 
Daniel Bell made his case with much conviction for the revival of civil society in the 
United States as the solution to stunt the expansion of bureaucracies. ^^  
Internationally-orientated, Michael Walzer prescribed his constructivist medicine - the 
civil society - as the healing of a conflictive world politics.^^ Coincidentally, this academic 
movement of the concept 'civil society' resonated with the dramatic events unfolding over 
the other hemisphere, which took the discourse of civil society so far as to universalize the 
2-�Edward Shils, The Virtue of Civil Society, Government and Opposition 26, 1:3-20 
See Robert Putnam D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, (Princeton, N.J.： 
Princeton University Press, 1993) 
See John Keane, Democracy and Civil Society, (London: Verso, 1989) 
See Daniel Bell, American Exceptionalism Revisited: the Role of Civil Society, The Public Interest, No. 95 (1989), 
pp.38-56 ‘ 
“ S e e Michael Walzer, The Idea of Civil Society, Dissent (Spring 1991), pp.293-304 
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political development irrespective of the historical and cultural difference. 
From the very beginning, the discussion of civil society in China had a tension between its 
theoretical orthodoxy and empirical deviation. The 1989 social movement was certainly a 
flashpoint of academic contention. Chamberlain summarizes the three distinct scholarly 
interpretations that frame the understanding of this movement by referring to civil 
society. ^^  The first interpretation pictured the out-of-the-blue formation of popular 
consciousness that spared protesters of their difference and rallied them up around a 
common cause.^^ However, Chamberlain contested this observation by making reference 
to the narratives revealing of the inconsistency in protesters' identity during the movement. 
The second interpretation, as represented by Andrew Nathan, ^^  dismissed the first 
interpretation's central thesis. Instead, it perceived the movement as a gradual germinating 
of the seed of a civil society pioneered by urban-based intellectuals and students. On that, 
Chamberlain could not agree, either. The weakness of this interpretation lies in the fact that 
there is a close relation between intellectuals and the state, and that questions the very 
independence that a civil society requires.^' The third interpretation saw 1989 as indicative 
of a civil society already existent before 1949 but suppressed into quiescence under the 
totalitarian political pressure.^^ This interpretation finds its reference in the literatures on 
Heath B. Chamberlain, On the Search of Civil Society, Modem China, Vol.19, No.2 (1993), pp. 199-215 
“ S e e L Sullivan, The Emergence of Civil Society in China, spring 1989，in Tony Saich (ed.), The Chinese People's 
Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989, (Armonk，NY: M.E. Shaipe. 1990) 
Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990) 
See Timothy Cheek, From Priests to Professionals: intellectuals under the CCP, in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and 
Elizabeth J. Perry, Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China: Learning from 1989, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1992) 
32 See David Strand, Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Public Sphere in China, Problems of Communism 39 (1998)，3: 
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the public sphere in pre-communist China .��Again, according to Chamberlain, doubts 
linger over whether the pre-communist China civil society, if any, was ever qualified as 
civil, since its deeply-rooted traditionality kept the gentry-centered public sphere 
extremely parochial and exclusive, which runs counter to the 'civility proviso' for an 
orthodox civil society. Moreover, the communist rule was also far from being facilitative of 
the 'commonness' among people. Its violent intrusion into the private life had break the 
natural bondage of people and pitted them against each other in various political campaigns, 
preempting even the slightest possibility of nurturing the emergence of civil society. This 
being said, then the question is how the civil society emerged at the end of the 1980s from 
nowhere. 
The debate continued into the mid-1990s with a turn of attention from the 1989 tragedy 
that slid gradually into the deep memory of witnesses and participants, to the booming of 
associational activities at that time. The central dispute, not much different from that over 
1989 social movement, is whether these popular associations {minjian tuanti) were civil 
society organization proper. On the face of it, the state remained a regulatory role in 
enforcing the compliance of social organization with social organization regulation but 
behind the regulatory framework is the fact that the state stretches out its administrative 
antenna into the social organizations by requiring them to be attached to government's 
a g e n c i e s . 3 4 This violates the independence proviso for a civil organization. This fast fact 
gradually tarnished the appeal of the concept of civil society, and raised the academic 
interest in corporatism. 
” See Philippe Huang, "Public Sphere"/,'Civil Society" in China?: The Third Realm between State and Society, Modern 
China, Vol. 19，No. 2’ pp.216-240 
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Borrowed from Philippe Schmitter who unearthed this concept from the writings of Iberian 
scholars,^^ corporatism can be defined "as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on 
their selection of leaders and articulation".^^ Simply put, it is a disciplined partnership 
between the state and society, aimed at keeping under control the sectoral interests within a 
single functional group. By definition, a corporatist structure presupposes the presence of 
the state in social associational activities, and given that many social organizations in 
China are legally attached to the state, it seems to be more descriptive of the reality than is 
the orthodox concept of civil society. 
More than that, the theoretical appeal of corporatism also lies in its differentiation of two 
subtypes within the concept: state and societal corporatism. In fact, the corporatism 
generalized by Schmitter is merely the state corporatism, which is 'authoritarian, top-down 
and dictatorial'. 37 The major difference that societal corporatism has from state 
corporatism is that, in societal corporatism, the representational organizations are more 
responsive to their respective constituencies, while the state is confined to a coordinatory 
role between representational organizations, rather than imposing its will through strict 
A detailed discussion of this issue will be made in Chapter 6. 
Mihail Manoilescu, The century of corporatism, (1934) 
Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in Pike F B and Stritch T (eds.), The New Corporatism 
Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1974) p. 
” See Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "Ism", (M.E. Sharpe, 1997)， 
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organizational control in the state corporatism. In other words, societal corporatism is 
"participatory, pluralistic and democratic" This conceptual differentiation facilities the 
theorization of socio-political transition in some authoritarian countries such as China, a 
reason why Anita Chan and Jonathan linger strongly advocated the use of corporatism to 
explain the transition of China's state-society relations. They viewed corporatism as an 
institutional manifestation of Confucian culture in East Asian countries, where Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan had displayed clear sign of corporatism in their politico-economic 
• • . 39 institutions. 
The concept of civil society, however, did not completely vanish from the academic 
discourse on the theorization of the state-society relations in China. Frolic presented an 
adapted form of the concept to acquire relevance to the peculiarity of China, meanwhile 
retaining the functional definition of civil s o c i e t y . 4 � T h e Frolic's state-led civil society, a 
term that may have shocked the whole-hearted admirer of civil society theory, was an 
attempt to bridge the gap central to the debate on civil society in China. Frolic argued that, 
as a part of the state, the state-led civil society is political incubator to which the state has to 
devolve control as reform deepens, and that it is not a center of citizen resistance to the 
state. Per Frolic, the importance of civil society in China does not lie in its independence 
from the state, but in its functional merits such as providing a training ground for the 
development of civic consciousness. For those who are theoretically orientated, this might 
be a sacrifice of the integrity of the concept 'civil society' for the sake of practical 
p l l 8 - 1 1 9 
川 See Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model, The Australian Journal of Chinese 
Affairs, No.33, (Jan., 1995), pp.29-53 
See B Michael Frolic, The Emergence of Civil Society in China, University of Toronto - York University Joint Center 
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convenience. In fact, Frolic's thesis is a reassertion of the theoretical relevance of civil 
society to the China's transition in state-society relations. However, his intention is 
seriously compromised by his concession that this 'state-led civil society is a form of 
corporatism，. 
Despite Frolic's failure, this thesis sticks to the concept of civil society as a theoretical 
starting point of this research for two reasons. First, corporatism, as White et al observed, is 
merely "one element in a more complex restructuring of relationships between state and 
society and not the most important at that"."^' This observation is based on a comprehensive 
evaluation of the development of social organizations as of 1996, conducted by Gordon 
White, Jude Howell and Shang Xiaoyuan. Their research covered trade unions, women 
organizations, rural social organizations, and business associations, and they concluded 
that the incorporation of social organizations by the state is uneven across region and sector 
and that the actual incorporated social organizations are "like a thin layer of marzipan on 
very large cake". So, put differently, corporatism is merely a fragmental, rather than 
systematic, measure that the state takes in response to the adjusting state-society relations, 
which means room still exists for the real civil society organizations to grow abreast of 
incoiporated organizations. The case analyzed by this thesis is exactly such an example. 
Second, civil society model is useful, as a preliminary theoretical sensitizer, to frame 
questions with respect to specific spontaneous associational activities. It does not exclude 
the possibility of them being incorporated as they move along, and the actual occurrence of 
incorporation does not invalidate the model either, because its merit lies in the partial focus 
for Asia Pacific Studies, 1996 
Gordon White, Jude Howell and Shang Xiaoyuan, In search of civil society : market reform and social change in 
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it places upon the process in which those social organizations get incorporated and on the 
reasons behind. 
This being said, there, however, is a fundamental weakness in the concept of civil society 
in its theorization of state-society relations. This concept tends to cause an obsessive 
attention on the role of society in the transitional process in exclusion of the role of the state. 
This problem is symptomatic especially of the researches on post-socialist countries where 
rising society is more likely to catch eyeballs. In China, the literatures on the 1989 tragedy 
are reflective of this tendency, as exemplified by the three approaches of interpretation that 
Chamberlain took issue with. So, a remedy is needed to 'bring the state back in，but to 
provide a balanced picture of the transition in state-society relations of China. 
Joel Migdal's thesis of state-in-society presents such a remedy. 42 State-in-society 
perspective is an intellectual reaction to the scholarly overemphasis on the role of the state 
in bringing about socioeconomic change in the developing countries. It reasserts that states 
as a part of societies may help mold, but are also continually molded by, the societies 
within which they are embedded. Migdal is skeptical of the effectiveness of looking 
exclusively within the state for answers to questions about what determines the states' 
choice of actions and why some actions turn out successful while others are not. Attention, 
Migdal emphasized, must be paid to the society as well in order to better understand 
socioeconomic changes. 
contemporary China, (Oxford : Clarendon Press ； Oxford ； New York : Oxford University Press, 1996) 
42 See Joel Migdal, State in society: studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another, (Cambridge : 
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Moreover, the state-in-society perspective has an implicit assumption about the interactive 
interface between the state and society. Retaining the conceptual separation of the state 
from society in the Weberian state-society literatures to which Midgal saw the need of 
revision, the state-in-society approach, however, also attempts to reestablish an organic 
connection between the two where we see the actions of state and society are mutually 
dependent. This interdependence must be understood in its dynamics instead of static 
description. 
Back to the state-society relations in China, the necessity of adopting this dynamic 
state-in-society relations is not only theoretically justified, but also confirmed by empirical 
research. Based on empirical study of trade Unions, women organizations, rural social 
organizations and business associations, White et al reached the conclusion that a 
‘yes-or-no’ approach to the study of China's civil society tends to 'provide partial and static 
snapshots which blind us to important elements of the reality and cannot capture the 
dynamics of a rapid changing social u n i v e r s e ，” In other words, the relation of the state 
with society is in a continual flux, and this justifies a shift of focus to the dynamics between 
actors. Ill addition, the authors summarized their observation that social organizations in 
China constituted an institutional terrain where state and society are intermingled and 
braided. 44 This attests exactly to the descriptive value and empirical validity of the 
state-in-society perspective in the research on China's state-society relations. 
B. Industrial relations as Embedded in the State-society Relations 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
43 Gordon White, Jude Howell and Shang Xiaoyuan, p.209 
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Heavily influenced by its economic-rational roots, industrial relations is sometimes 
divided into macro and micro aspects. Micro perspective looks at the work-based 
employment relations, examining a range or workplace-based employment issues, and the 
operation of labor process. Literatures from this perspective abounds whose focus is 
mainly on how unit-based SOE has adapted to the drastic restructuring.'^^ The micro 
approach has in the recent years developed into two prongs. One focuses on the workplace 
recruitment, pay system, remuneration and compensation, etc under the rubric of HRM.46 
The other focuses especially on the labor process in private and foreign owned enterprises, 
where migrant workers concentrate. The issues involved, however, are quite politicized, 
concerning labor rights and independent unionism. Speaking of this second prong, the 
macro perspective has to step in. The macro perspective focuses on societal-level 
institutions, such as the state, trade unions and employers' organizations (in this thesis, a 
new player - the social organization working for migrant workers - amounting to more 
importance) and maps the overall industrial relations framework, and the so-called labor 
regime pertains exactly to the macro level of industrial relations, defining the relations 
between institutions in the industrial relations. 
The macroanalysis of China's industrial relations is usually conducted in the state-society 
relations framework, since the state has been playing a dominant role in it ever since 1949. 
This state domination is built in the state corporatist structure through state licensed 




perspective have a pronounced focus on the relations of official trade unions with the 
state.47 This tendency is not inexplicable. First, the official trade unions are the only 
representational organization legally empowered to represent the working class. Despite 
the fact that some associational activities keeps emerging in the 1990s, their legal status 
disadvantages them in either their operation or expansion. Second, official unions are 
incorporated in the labor policy making process, thus enabling it to influence the change in 
legal framework of labor regime.48 Second, the fact that the official unions have for several 
times in the history of PRC challenged the state on behalf of workers justifies the hope to 
be placed on the unions to break the status quo and become more protective of the 
w o r k e r s . 4 9 On this count, Anita Chan is an optimistic scholar that who anticipated that the 
unions, fashioned in state corporatist structure, would ultimately become societal 
coiporatist due to the mounting pressure of social upheaval caused by exploited workers. 
Feng Chen, however, seems to be dubious of the prediction that Chan made ten years 
earlier.50 Based on solid empirical research, Chen identified a pattern of unions' behavior 
in settling industrial disputes. The pattern of unions' behavior is defined by three types of 
actions that unions take in response to corresponding types of workers' action in the 
industrial disputes. For individual workers' dispute, unions opt for legal representation; for 
workers' collective actions, unions opt for mediation; and for independent organizing, 
46 See Fang Lee Cooke, HRM, Work and Employment in China, (London, New York: Routeledge, 2005) 
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unions opt for hard-line preemption. This pattern of unions' behavior is reflective of the 
institutional parameters imposed by state corporatist structure, and Chen concluded that 
"institutional structures of state corporatism that incorporated unions with the state 
apparatus have preordained unions' options in a conflict situation." 
Anita Chan intended to use the concept of corporatism, and especially the differentiation 
between state and societal corporatism, to envision the transitional trajectory of China's 
labor regime. She pinned her hope on the official unions that, given the possibility of social 
upheaval caused by exploited workers, trade unions would be most likely to rid itself of the 
state corporatist straitjacket and evolve into societal corporatist form. However, as 
mentioned in the previous part of this chapter, the corporatist model does not exhaust other 
forms of transitional state-society relations, so neither does it in the case of industrial 
relations. As White et al clearly pointed out that, 
"Even if political conditions are favorable to a corporatist solution, however, its 
feasibility remains in doubt. China is not a city-state like Singapore and any effort to 
establish corporatist institutions will run foul of the country's size and regional 
diversity and the increasing complexity and dynamism of its economy...the rapidly 
growing diversity of the Chinese labor force and the varied problems its faces means 
that there will inevitably potential challenge of rival organizations."^^ 
So, attention should not be paid exclusively to the relations of official unions with the state 
Reform, China Quarterly, 2003 
5丨 See Chen, p.21 
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in order to study the transition in China's labor regime. It is necessary to keep an eye on the 
development of spontaneous social initiatives, of which social organization working for 
migrant workers is definitely a part, and to be sensitive to the qualitative changes in their 
development. That is where the curve of labor regime transition may be passing through its 
inflection points. My research is exactly attempting to step into this breach. 
Nevertheless, one point needs to be noticed in Chen's research. Chen's research confirms 
the importance of "strategiciiess" of actors in the China's labor industrial relations. Being 
strategic means that the actor follows a pattern of action that maximizes its intended 
outcome given the limits that constrain the actions. For the official unions, the limits that 
confront its actions are defined collectively by the pressure from the state and the threat of 
being completely irrelevant in the market economy because of its inability to protect 
workers. So, the pattern of union actions revealed by Chen is a strategic outcome given the 
limits. My research is exactly intended to map out the strategic behavioral pattern, not of 
the unions, but of the social organization in its pursuit of providing welfare to workers and 
protecting their rights given the limits it has to face. 
However, there is one aspect of Chen's research that my research will try to revise. Chen's 
research adopted a static view on the structure of limits that unions have to consider before 
taking actions in response to industrial conflicts. In his research, it took the state's attitude 
and workers' actions as given, and based on that, plotted the pattern of unions' actions. It is 
not that this static perspective is not correct. It is correct, and more than that, it does reveal 
something of importance to the understanding of unions' behavior under the certain 
Gordon White, Jude Howell and Shang Xiaoyiian, p.253 
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circumstances, but it is unable to throw light on the future development of the relations 
between unions and the state. So, a static view is not the desirable method to study the labor 
regime transition. Instead, a dynamic perspective has to be adopted to comprehend the 
‘strategicness’ within the framework of interactions between the two players. In other 
words, the structure of limit is fluid. Only by focusing on the strategic interactions can we 
answer the question as to how the unions actually formed this behavioral pattern, and can 
we summarize the rules of interactions which still apply to the future and help predict how 
the structure of limits that the actor face will be changed, which, in turn, shape the future 
interactions of the two players. In fact, the strategic interaction coincides with the 
state-in-society perspective explained in the part A of this chapter. My research exactly 
adopts this strategic interaction perspective between the social organization and the state in 
order to the labor regime in transition. 
C. Major Inadequacies in Literatures 
Vast as the literatures on China's state-society relations transition might be, they share two 
common inadequacies. First, they are guided by a motive to generalize the contemporary 
China's state-society relations by looking at a broad picture, unaware of the fact that the 
state-society in transition is rather fragmented in pattern. It varies according to areas of 
representation, regional economic development, and even singular specifics of a social 
organization, etc. Therefore, a forced generalization about China's state-society relations 
might well be erroneous and sometimes even distort the reality. 
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Second, the theory-informed researches on China's state-society relations are characterized 
by their symptomatic neglect of the role that western civil society plays in catalyzing the 
transition. This can be traced to the fact that not until early 1990s did the Chinese 
government grant its permission to foreign NGOs to operate in the country. So, the initial 
blossoming of civil society in the 1980s that led to a climax in 1989 unfolded almost 
completely without the presence of western NGOs. However, this is no longer the case into 
the 1990s and 2000s when Fforeign NGOs have become more and more active in China. 
‘They have brought money and expertise to facilitate the social reengineering in the 
reforming China. So, this research is exactly an attempt to fill the gaps in the literature of 
state-society relations. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
In the previous chapter, I have argued the traditional approach to state-society relations 
transition in China might yield erroneous generalizations because of its static perspective. 
Therefore, this thesis attempts to overcome this limitation by making an in-depth analysis 
of a multi-player strategic interactive process in the context of CSR that brings the local 
NGOs to where they now find themselves. Clearly, the explanation is not a straightforward 
process. As Sayer wrote, "difficulties arise from an interplay between the nature of the 
object of study, on one hand, and our aims, expectations and methods on the o t h e r " . 
Therefore, particular attention is paid to the research methods to ensure that they fit the 
nature of research question. 
This chapter is intended to describe and justify the methods to be employed to address the 
research question outlined in the first chapter. It will be argued that given the nature of 
research question, a case study approach based on qualitative methods will be appropriate, 
since the focus on a single case will reveal how the matrix of relationships between players 
dictates the evolvement of a social organization, which will cast light on the changing 
state-society relations. The chapter begins with description of the overall research design, 
and then justifies the use of a single case study to approach the research question. Of course, 
discussion will be made about the selection of the case, followed by some highlights on the 
problems associated with the single case study. 
A. Research Question and Research Design 
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This research attempts to study how the state-society relations evolved in the field of 
industrial relations given the emerging context of CSR. To surface the casual relationship 
therein, the research focuses on several inter-player relations that, combined, partially 
dictate the speed and the direction of the transition. These relationships are quite numerous, 
constituting a matrix of variables, interacting with each other. The complexity and subtlety 
of these casual processes requires an intensive research design, which focuses the analysis 
on one or two cases in order to acquire an in-depth perspective of how casual relationships 
get established. 
A case study approach contrasts to an extensive research design based on surveys. 
Generally speaking, there are two types of survey research. One type examines a limited 
number of properties associated with a wide range of cases, and the other investigates a 
wide range of properties associated with many cases. The former yields explanations of 
limited utility due to the possibility of overlooking variables and relations that are critical 
in developing a model of explanation. The latter type of survey research tends to blur the 
true casual relations by examining too many cases and a wide range of variables.54 By 
covering a large of number of cases and properties, a correlation among many variables 
may be brought to surface. However, these relationships may not be causal, and thus 
requires intensive case studies to verify its casual validity.^^ An extensive research design, 
therefore, is helpful in generalizing research findings, but less useful than a case study 
Andrew Sayer, Radical political economy: a critique, (London Sage, 1995) 
Andrew Sayer, Method in social science: A realist approach, (London, Routledge 1992), pp.241-242. 
“ N i c k L.Smith, Improve evaluation theory through the empirical study of evaluation practice, American Journal of 
Evaluation, Vol. 14’ No. 3, 237-242 (1993), p.25 
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approach in developing an in-depth explanation of how a NGO sector managed to play a 
role in the industrial relation. 
The research methods deployed to process the case study in this thesis are literature review, 
documentary study, and semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews have the 
merit to enhance the level of direct contact between the researcher and interviewees. The 
close contact in a semi-structured interview makes it possible for a researcher to probe and, 
where necessary, ask the interviewees to clarify points of interest. It also allows the 
researcher to follow up new issues that has not previously been identified. Moreover, as the 
respondents respond to open-ended questions in their own words, the researcher has 
greater access to their interpretation of events and the level of significance that they attach 
to these events. ^^  All this indicates that the semi-structured interviews provide the 
researcher with a better instrument for addressing the complex "how" and "why" questions 
in this research. 
B. Justifications for Case Study as an Appropriate Method for this Research 
Case study is considered an appropriate strategy for this research. I suit the objective of this 
thesis, which attempts to examine how intra-player relationships shaped the transition of 
state-society relations and labor regime. Granted, case study research has often criticized 
for its lack of representativeness and generalizabilty to a wider population.，? As Bryman 
Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp.95-96; Tim May, Social 
research: issues, methods and process, (Buckingham ； Philadelphia, Pa.: Open University Press, 1997), pp. 111-112 
” Colin Robson, Real world research: a resource for social scientists and practitioner-researchers, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993), p. 168; Dawn Burton, Research training for social scientists : a handbook for postgraduate researchers, (London : 
Sage Publications, 2000, pp.224-225 
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points out, "for many people, this reliance on a single case poses a problem of how far it is 
possible to generalize the results of such r e s e a r c h " . I n d e e d , one case is far from being 
sufficient to form a general picture of how state-society has been transformed. 
Nevertheless, the objective of this research is not to make generalizations about a wider 
population. Rather, the research aims to analyze the casual relationship between the 
state-society relation transitional trajectory and the perception that state and society have 
towards each other. In other words, the research is concerned with "the generalizability of 
cases to theoretical propositions rather than to populations or universes".^^ 
This aside, Yin provides three important benchmarks against which to evaluate the 
necessity of using case study as the research method, and an item-by-item check will 
justify case study as the appropriate method to be applied to this r e s e a r c h , Yin's three 
benchmarks are as follows: (1) the type of research question posed; (2) the extent of control 
a research has over actual research target's behavioral events; and (3) the degree of focus 
on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
Research question. Questions asking about 'why' and 'how' usually renders case study as 
an appropriate and suitable method to be adopted in the research.^' This is not to say that 
'why' and 'how' questions cannot be answered by other major social research methods 
such as surveys and experiments. For why question, the propriety of adopting case study is 
Alan Bryman，1988, p.88 
Alan Bryman’ 1988’ p.90 � Robert K. Yin, Case study research: design and methods, (Sage Publications, 1994), p.4 
6丨 Yin, P.5 
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justified by the complexity of social phenomena where relevant explanatory variables are 
abundant and unknown to researchers before the research commences. Case study assists 
exactly in the attempt to explore the pertaining research terrain by focusing on one or a 
multiple cases, searching for possible variables that are likely to explain the research 
puzzle, and to delve further into these factors, interpreting and analyzing for the sake of 
generalization and theory building. Sometimes, existing literatures can guide through the 
exploratory phase of the research by narrowing down the range of inquiry, and case study 
follows to improve or rectify previous explanations of the social phenomenon. In general, 
case study helps construct an in-depth view regarding the research question and then the 
establishment of multiple explanatory links is possible, leading further to generalizing 
from the case being studied. In the case of how question, it causes a bit of confusion in that, 
taken literally, how question seeks for a descriptive account of a phenomenon or a situation, 
but at the same time, resembles a why question in connotation. Unlike questions like 'how 
did you spend your time yesterday', some how questions actually are making an inquiry 
regarding 'the operational links needing to be traced over time，.62 In essence, this type of 
how questions is not unlike why questions. 
My research question, as stated in the previous chapter, is how NGOs have carved out a 
role for themselves in the China's industrial relations in the context of CSR. This is a how 
question in form but a why question in nature. Instead of using 'why' explicitly, 'how' 
places an extra emphasis on a historical perspective that traces relevant explanations over a 
period of time. The preparatory phase, de-facto emergence, daily functions and activities of 
the NGO, all these take place over time. Their strategies are far from being conceived at the 
“ Y i n , P.6 
46 
outset, but rather subject to continual adaptations while gaming with several other players. 
Only by plunging into the history can their success or failure, performance or 
underperformance be explained with clarity. 
Obviously, this picture is no less complicated than any that requires the case study as a 
necessary method to forge explanations. The variables likely to have explanatory power 
might be tremendous in number and uncertain at the beginning. Is the infiltration ofNGOs 
into industrial relations due to a permissive state that are gradually lifting its control over 
the sphere? Does the leadership of labor-issue NGOs have a marvelous bargaining power 
versus the state because of its personal ties with certain top-echelon officials? Or is it that 
the state finds it profitable to have labor-issue NGOs play a role in the industrial relations? 
These are but a few points of guess that may figure in the explanation of the research 
question. By focusing on a case through exploratory to explanatory phase, many 
sub-questions will be answered, new ones be brought to surface, and a multiple 
explanatory links be ultimately established. 
Control over research targets ‘ behaviors. Experiments also cater for how and why 
questions, except that the number of variables to be examined should be limited. The 
degree of control that experiments have over research target's behaviors is, and has to be, 
high. Maintaining an appropriate level of control is critical to the success of experiments. 
By holding unchanged certain behaviors of the research target, experiments seek to match 
causes and effects. Case study, however, does not require controls as such. It traces events 
as they flow over time and takes what is given to it, without manipulation. Granted, case 
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study is usually guided by theoretical propositions conceived before the investigation gets 
started, yet it is necessary for case study researchers to keep their minds open, to be 
prepared to deal with the incursion of some unexpected variables of critical relevance and 
getting them factored in the ultimate explanations. 
Needless to say, this research is impossible to exert any control over the process wherein a 
NGO sector secured a role to play in the China's industrial relations, because it is basically 
a historical analysis. The only feasible way by which a research tries understanding how 
this role is secured is to track down variables over the development trajectory of a single 
case that has contributed to its success. 
Contemporaiy versus historical events. As aforesaid, to answer the research question of 
this thesis, it requires a historical analysis where the events that unfolded in the history are 
to be examined with respect to their effect on the evolvement of the NGO. The case study 
serves this purpose very well. 
C. Selection of the Case 
This research features a case study of Institute of Contemporary Observation (ICO), a 
Shenzhen-based NGO working for migrant workers. Founded in 2001, ICO was an 
initiative taken by Liu Kaiming, a Ph.D holder in literature and a former journalist. His 
leadership has brought ICO a nationwide reputation for its effort to improve social 
conditions of migrant workers by virtue of its corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
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advocacy activities. 
ICO is chosen for several reasons. First, compared to other social organizations in China, 
ICO does not have official background. The organization is an independent entity with a 
leadership from media and business. If the strict definition of civil society is applied, ICO 
is definitely a qualified example. Second, ICO is credited for its hospitality towards 
researchers because it values the publicity that researches could bring to it. This will be of 
great help to have good interviews. Besides, information is more accessible regarding ICO, 
because it has frequently shown up in the media. Third, and most importantly, ICO is a 
huge success, compared to its counterparts. An in-depth search for the factors that 
contributed its success will be likely to surface the "secret path" whose twists and turns 
could tell the pushes and pulls in the development of the organization in the context of CSR, 
and this is extremely informative of the development unfolding in the labor regime and 
civil society as a whole. 
D. Conducting Case Studies 
Generally speaking, case study permits flexibility, but this does not mean that it is an 
unstructured research method. The case study in this research is informed by the analytical 
framework that shapes the research question of this thesis: strategic interaction. The case 
study attempts exactly to unravel a matrix of relationships that contextualizes the strategic 
interaction between the NGO and the state. In other words, the case study seeks to 
anatomize the strategic interactive process and correlate it with the development trajectory 
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of the NGO. 
As Yin indicates, case study can draw on more than one source of data and the use of these 
multiple source of data can improve the construct validity through a process of 
t r i a n g u l a t i o n . 6 3 Therefore, t o enhance t h e validity o f research findings, t h e following 
sources of data were used: 
(1) Documentary evidence, which includes newspaper articles, ICO sponsored 
periodicals and its annual report. 
(2) Semi-structured interviews with Liu Kaiming, Chairman of ICO, and another two 
social activists who asked for anonymity. 
In this research, the documentary evidence was mainly the pamphlets and a periodical that 
the case NGO publishes, together with an annual report published in 2005. However, these 
information were cross-examined through semi-structured interview. 
This research depends heavily on interviews, because of the inadequacies in documentary 
evidence. In the first place, although ICO has a good reputation for its transparency, the 
accessible printed information provides nothing but the general description of the activities 
that ICO has carried out. However, the specifics and the process that led to these activities 
are not found in these resources. Only interviews could pry into the black box and shed 
light on the logic that correlates to each other a series of seemingly unrelated events. 
50 
Prior to interviews, the documentary evidence was examined in order to identify the 
interesting points for interviews. In this research, the interviews with the two anonymous 
social activists are intended to double check the information derived from interviews with 
Liu Kaiming, head of the ICO. The interviews with Liu Kaiming took place in August and 
September 2006, and interviews with the two anonymous social activists in December 
2006. 
E. Problems Associated with the Case Study 
Obviously, a single case is far from being sufficient to generalize the pattern of labor 
regime transition and in a broad perspective, the evolvement of state-society relations. 
More cases are needed if this pattern of transition could be theoretically established. 
However, the single case that this research focuses on did provide a rich source of data 
whereby some significant theoretical issues could be addressed. 
F. Summary 
The chapter describes the methods to be employed in this research and explains the 
propriety of using these methods. To analyze the strategic interactive process that, the 
thesis focuses on a single-case study, the Institute of Contemporary Observation, a social 
organization based in Shenzhen and committed to improve labor conditions. The merit of 
case study in this research is incontestable. First, the complexity of this process makes a 
range of variables relevant in the explanation, and the case study could an in-depth analysis 
Yin，pp.91-92 
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on each of them. Second, the case study is well suited to research question of "how" and 
"why" type, which is exactly the type of question that this research seeks to answer. 
Nevertheless, the problem associated with the single case study is its inadequacy in making 
a generalization on the pattern of transition in labor regime and state-society relations. 
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Chapter Four: Impoverishment of Migrant Labor: Global Capitalism and China's 
Urban-rural Structural Divide 
Social organization working for migrant workers is not a recent product of the market 
reform. Its emergence was witnessed far early in the late 1980s, when the number of 
migrant workers leaving their hometown and settling along the southeastern coastline of 
China so expanded that it made this part of population a conspicuous demographic change 
concomitant to the China's economic development. They represent the bulk of the 
workforce that makes the export-oriented industry possible for the state's developmentalist 
strategy. They are found toiling in enterprises, either foreign or domestic invested, many of 
which are poorly equipped for the sake of curbing the cost as much as possible in order to 
earn the last bit of price competitiveness in the world market. In a sense, migrant workers 
are reduced completely to their economic being, working like the cogs in the machine of 
the export-oriented industry, while their social being is completely lost in the rigid 
urban-rural structural divide. It is against this socio-economic background that social 
organizations working for migrant workers began to form in the pockets of urban areas, 
small and isolated. 
These social organizations were the buds of what have so far developed into a diversified, 
active and innovative sphere of modem NGOs. They specialize in different activities 
regarding migrant workers, cooperate with domestic counterparts and foreign 
organizations, and maneuver flexibly within the government's regulatory framework. The 
number of these organizations is hard to estimate, but some successful and well developed 
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ones do indicate that a vast network, as loosely-knit as it might be, is actually taking shape, 
encompassing a variety of organizations of different scale and legal status. Compared to 
their early 1990s precursors, the word 'transformation' would not be a hyperbolic 
misnomer to describe this change. 
Of particular interest to this research is a type of social organizations as exemplified by 
ICO, which has achieved an outstanding success in terms of their effort to enhance 
workplace labor standards and make their voice heard by a wide public audience and the 
state alike. The development of these social organizations is not an process of civil society 
advancement in a socialist economy that has been undergoing liberalization, but a 
gradualist evolution process driven by some major structural factors and their choice of 
strategies, and this chapter is devoted to an in-depth analysis of the former, and the next 
two chapters are assigned to deal with the latter. 
In this chapter, two major structural factors, namely the economic and the socio-political 
institutions, will be brought into detailed discussion. From the perspective of the economic 
institutions, the characteristic parameters of the political economy of export-oriented 
industry, a ramification of global capitalism, will be laid out to explain the economic 
institutional mechanism that disadvantages the workers in China, thus breeding 
associational activities in an effort to protect the workers. The socio-political perspective 
will be categorized into two parts, one focusing on the domestic socio-political institutions 
that has kept migrant workers marginalized in the society, and the other on how the two 
major western movements, namely the consumer movement and corporate social 
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responsibility (CSR) movement, helped to remove the bottleneck that pestered these social 
organizations in their development in China. 
A. Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of Export-orientated Industry 
China's economic miracle has frequently been headlines of major public media for the last 
two decades. Its around 10% economic growth for consecutive years has attracted some 
developing countries such as Vietnam to emulate the economic development model 
adopted in China. However, this model is not a new invention, but a modified piece whose 
origin found its application in what is widely called, the four Asian Tigers: Singapore, 
South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Export-oriented industrialization (EOI) is the key to this economic model. It is a trade and 
economic policy aiming to speed-up the industrialization process through exporting goods 
for which the country has a comparative advantage. The logic behind the EOI is that, given 
the technological backwardness and cheap labor, the country can specialize in 
labor-intensive industry and export the products in exchange for dollars which, in turn, can 
be used to pay for technology transfer. The adoption of this strategy led to a generic rapid 
economic development in the four Asian Tigers. As shown in Table 4.1, the Four Tigers 
achieved average annual growth rates of from 8.6 to 10% during the first 15 years between 
1965 and 1980. Their rate of growth slowed down slightly in the 1980s due to recessions in 
the industrial nations, but the four economies still managed to grow at the relatively high 
pace of from 6.1 to 9.7% per year, and their annual growth rates of from 5.2 to 8.3 in the 
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first half of 1990s are still very impressive. 
In China, EOI also delivered its promise of prosperity as it did for the Four Tigers. In the 
early 1980s, foreign direct investments (FDIs) made their way into the several government 
designated special economic regions and hooked China up with the global capitalist 
economy. After a little political setback in 1989，China reaffirmed its determination to 
carry on its development cause. At the same time, with the collapse of bipolar international 
political order, the time was ripe for the globalization to play its much-vaulted magic. The 
expanding market and a world economy free of political barrier further involved China into 
the international capitalist market through its export-oriented industry. The economy was 
taking off. 
The economic benefits that export-oriented industry brought to China are uncontestable, 
but the expense is just as tremendous. Not unlike the Four Tigers, the working class in 
China is subject to massive inhuman exploitation. Excessively long working hours, 
militarist control of workers, meager wages with no overtime pay, to name but a few, all 
these are the prevalent labor practices found in the enterprises along the southeastern 
c o a s t l i n e . 6 4 In a nutshell, the workers have not benefited from the economic prosperity that 
they have built with their hands. Instead, they are the ones that have suffered the most, and 
this systematic workplace repression finds its explanation in the structure of the EOI 
political economy: global production chain and outsourcing. 
See Anita Chan, China's workers under assault: the exploitation of labor in a globalizing economy, (Armonk, N.Y.: 
M.E. Shaipe, 2001) 
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The EOI in the developing economies follows what Bruce Cumings calls the "the classic 
product-cycle industrialization pattern".^^ The product cycle is a continuum with one end 
of labor-intensive and low-skilled products and the other of capital-intensive and 
high-skilled products. The EOI process is exactly the first part of a journey from 
labor-intensive production to the capital-intensive production. The success of EOI, 
however, depends on the initial phase of growing labor-intensive products export, which, 
in turn, is sustained by the strong demand for imports in the western markets, the US 
market especially, and this was what actually happened for China's export-oriented 
industry. 
The main reason for U.S. strong demand for China's products was the increasingly active 
global sourciiig by large U.S. retailers as well as by multinational corporations. Global 
outsourcing is a practice to contract out the production to a network of producers located in 
different countries in order to reduce overall production cost. This network is not a simple 
two-level one with the multinational corporations at the top linked through production 
orders to various producers. It is usually a pyramid-like hierarchical structure containing 
several levels of subcontractors, each being a node on a production chain. 
China, as a receiving end of the outsourcing chain, is not an early participant of this 
globalized production process. So, when China got itself involved, it was simply picking 
up the section of labor-intensive products that the early participants had left off because 
65 See Bruce Cumings, The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political economy: Industrial sectors, 
product cycles, and political consequences, in Federick C. Deyo (ed.), The Political Economy of the New Asia 
Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987)，also see R Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational 
Spread of US Enterprises (New York: Basic Books, 1971) 
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their economies had successfully upgraded to a higher level of product cycle. In fact, when 
global sourcing by the U.S. corporations first appeared, it started with the garment industry. 
In the 1960s, cheap made-in-Japan clothing showed up in American shopping malls and 
supermarkets. In the 1970s and 1980s, made-in-Japan garments gave way to 
made-in-Taiwans, made-in-Koreas and made-in-Hong Kongs, while Japan upgraded into 
capital-intensive products. Now, western markets are awash with made-in-China garments, 
while at this moment, Japan has far early moved to the upper end of the souring chain, and 
itself is now outsourcing production to China and Southeast Asian countries such as 
Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, indicating a successful transformation of its economy. 
The power structure of outsourcing commodities chain is characterized as buyer-driven or 
in Gereffi's words, demand-responsive.''^ It is the buyers who specify design and quality of 
the finished goods they want to sell, and that being done, they look for manufacturers who 
can meet their specifications and subcontract with them. Quality and design aside, price is 
also determined mainly by the buyers. It is not that there is no negotiation over price 
between the buyer and subcontractors, but that for labor-intensive products, the entry 
barrier to producer is low enough to deprive bargaining power of an individual contractor 
with the buyer. There are simply too many producers that are capable of producing the 
subcontracted products, such as clothing and textiles. As low as the price it is that the buyer 
wants, so long as there is still profit margin, no matter how small, the subcontractor will 
have no choice but to accept the deal in order to survive and drive out competitors. 
66 Gary Gereffi, The role of Big Buyers in Global Commodities Chains: How US. retail networks affect oversea 
production pattern, in Gary Gereffi and Miguel Koreniewicz (eds.)’ Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Westport, 
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This passive stance that China's subcontractors are forced to take along the outsourcing 
chain has serious implications for the China's workers. The low profit margin that 
subcontractors earn through subcontracting will ultimately translate into an imperative to 
cut the cost as much as possible on the part of contractors. Therefore, it is frequently found 
that wages are reduced, due pay defaulted and occupational safety investment slashed. In 
many China's export-oriented enterprises, the working environment is so terrible that it 
poses a great threat to the health of workers. In many enterprises, workers are not allowed 
out of the factory during the weekdays and they take their meals in the factory canteen, but 
the quality of food is too poor to meet workers' nutritional need. These are just a few 
examples of how the buyer-driven nature of outsourcing business leads to inhuman labor 
practice of the contractors in China and other developing countries. 
B. Labor Regime Facilitative to Exploitation 
The feasibility of EOI hinges on a tamed working class to be exploited for the sake of the 
first bucket of gold necessary to upgrade the industry. The logic behind is simple and 
straightforward. The exploitation of workers is inevitable since it is the only source of 
finance at the very outset of EOI economy. So, it is typical of EOI states to have its labor 
regime fashioned in a way that is facilitative of the capitalists' exploitation of the working 
class. In other words, the EOI economy usually has the type of labor regime that 
subordinates the working class in the industrial relations. 
Without exception, the working class in the Four Tigers all weathered their days of bitter 
CT: Praeger, 1994) 
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suppression. The developmentalist industrial policies led the states in all the four territories 
to forge a strategic ally with export-oriented enterprises and at the same time to take a firm 
hand with the workers whose associational activities such as forming independent unions 
and rallying strikes were subject to close monitoring and harsh crackdown. In Singapore, a 
massively repressive labor policy was put in place in the 1960s in support of government's 
decision to switch the economy to EOL The policy resulted in the final elimination of 
oppositional unions and their replacement by government-controlled unions affiliated to 
the National Trade Unions Congress (NTUC). Moreover, the government took a dominant 
role in the collective bargaining process and reduced permissible retrenchment benefits, 
overtime work, bonuses, maternity leave and fringe benefits by the legislation of 
Employment Act.^^ In Taiwan, the widespread local opposition to the Kuomintang (KMT) 
occupation in 1947 gave rise to the KMT's draconian political and labor control buttressed 
by an overarching martial law. Unions were put under tight regulations and incorporated 
into local government's agencies. These efforts proved effective in laying the foundation of 
EOI that gathered pace from the 1960s on. In terms of collective bargaining, KMT 
government remained a secondary role throughout the high EOI period, because a "weak, 
dispersed and largely agrarian work force" in Taiwan made the labor controls largely 
centered in enterprise, and this was reinforced by labor legislation that encourages the 
paternalistic personnel practices of employers. In South Korea where labor militancy stood 
out among the Four Tigers, the EOI economy translated into Park government's strict labor 
control policies that established state corporatist unions (Federation of Korean Trade 
67 Frederic C. Deyo, Beneath the miracle: labor subordination in the new Asian industrialism, (Berkeley; University of 
California Press, 1989) 
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Unions, FKTU) and encouraged militarist labor control in the enterprises.*^^ Office of 
Labor Affairs, a government bureau in charge of labor polices, was even headed by a 
former national police force director, a sign of government's intention to police the labor 
movement. Collective bargaining was also strictly regulated by the state, so its actual 
practice was very limited and became only possible when industrial conflicts went too out 
of hand. Hong Kong, however, had a different story than its three counterparts. The state's 
intervention in labor controls was very limited, and the labor regime remained relatively 
liberal. But its unique political geographic circumstances rendered its working class 
extremely docile and practical minded, therefore voluntarily tolerant to exploitation.^^ 
Obviously, common to all export-oriented industry economies is the institutional 
arrangement that prohibits the formation of collective bargaining mechanism and 
independent unionism, and this is also true of China. 
In China, the absence of collective bargaining and independent unionism are a heritage of 
its hardcore communist tradition. Owing to the communist ideology in China's pre-reform 
era, collective bargaining and independent unionism were of no socio-economic necessity. 
In the communist China, the labor-management adversarial relations fundamental to a 
capitalist economy was legally non-existent. Capitalists were replaced by the state in the 
name of the working class, so that workers were no longer deemed as trading their labor for 
wages but rather, they were supposed to work for themselves. The industrial conflicts were 
of no relevance whatsoever to the industrial relations in China, though it was never true in 
See Seung-Ho Kwon and Michael O'Donnell, The Chaebol and Labour in Korea: the Development of Management 
Strategy in Hyundai, (London ； New York : Routledge, 2001) 
69 See Frederic Deyo, Beneath the miracle: labor subordination in the new Asian industrialism, (Berkeley : University of 
California Press, 1989) 
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reality. This is what Fox termed as the unitary model of industrial relations that harmonize 
different actors into a w h o l e . So, collective bargaining and independent unionism were 
deprived of their mis on d'etre, and in their place was the "administrative relation" between 
the state and the workers/ ' whereby the state instituted a series of measures — such as 
allocating labor, setting national wage scales, determining social welfare standards, 
formulating work rules and so on - to standardize industrial relations practices and thus 
"administer" conflicts of interest to their minimum. This administrative relation was 
rationalized by the fact that managers, like workers, were themselves employees of the 
state in the SOE system,^^ so that the state could wield the communist ideology that the 
interests of workers were contained within the interests of the mangers to preempt 
industrial conflicts on the one hand, and act as an arbitrator if conflicts did arise, on the 
other. 
The adoption of EOI and market reform, however, kept the taboo of independent unionism 
and collective bargaining, this time not because of their legal incompatibility with 
communist ideology but because of their strategic significance in making EOI possible. 
The prohibition of independent unionism is encoded in laws. In both 1982 Trade Union 
Law and the amended 2001 version, the ACFTU is granted a monopolistic position in 
representing the workers. While Article 7 of labor law and Article 3 of 2001 Trade Union 
Law provide that the workers "shall have the right to join and organize trade unions in 
70 Allen Fox, Industrial Relations: A social Critique of Pluralist Ideology, in John Child (ed.), Man and Organization, 
(Allen & Unwin，1966) 
71 See Kai Chang, Safeguarding Labor Rights (Laoquan Baozhang), in Labor Relations, Laborers and Labor Rights: 
Labor Issues in Contemporary China (Laodong guanxi, Laodongzhe, Laoquan: Dangdai Zhongguo Laodong Wenti), 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Laodong Chebanshe, 1995) 
72 See Chang, also see Aiwen Wang, Social Labor Relations: An Examination and Analysis of its Evolution (Shenhui 
Laodong Guanxi: Yanbian guocheng de Kaocha Yu Fenxi), (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 1993) 
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accordance with the law", the unions thus organized in the enterprises must report to the 
trade union organization at the higher level for approval.?] These stipulations illegalize any 
independent organizations outside the cover of the ACFTU which is under the supervision 
of the party state. The absence of the independent unionism renders ineffective the 
collective bargain clauses in the Labor Law, since the unions are legally required to 
represent workers in signing collective contracts 
C. The Socio-political Underpinnings of the Labor Regime: Residence Registration 
System and Two-tier Labor Market 
The repressive labor regime alone does not explain the docility of working class composed 
of migrant laborers. Given that the traditional urban proletariat proved to be extremely 
activist throughout the PRC history, there must be other reasons that account for the 
difference. From an institutional perspective, the residence registration system (Hukou) 
and dualist labor market present themselves as two such important factors. Their effect on 
the plight of Chinese migrant labor is similar to what happened to the British emerging 
working class in the century. On the eve of industrial revolution, the enclosure 
movement drove crowds of petty landowners into the urban area that was in dire need of 
labor to fuel the industrial growth. Later, the British parliament enacted a piece of 
legislation banning vagrancy in the cities, depriving the migrants of their right to feed on 
charity and leaving them the only choice to sell their labor in sweatshops. In the same vein, 
the residence registration system and dualist labor market in China leave the migrant 
“ S e e Article 11, Trade Union Law, 2001 
74 See Bill Taylor, Chang Kai and Li Qi, Industrial Relations in China, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003) 
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workers the only choice to toil in the exploitative EOI sector. 
The residence registration system is a social mechanism that the CCP put in place to 
categorize the population into two distinct parts: rural peasants and urban residents. It was 
one of the earliest social policies that CCP enforced after its takeover of the power in 1949 
in an effort to lay the very foundation for the imminent implementation of the economic 
modernization plan. This social engineering was guided by the CCP's strategy that 
prioritizes the development of the heavy industry. To that end, the CCP curbed the urban 
living cost by forcing a low price policy on the agricultural produces, and had the flow of 
commodities under the control of the government.乃 And the key to the plan was the strict 
demographic control that halted voluntary mobility and heavily regulated the distribution 
of the workforce between rural and urban areas. So, in a nutshell, the CCP sought to 
finance its modernization project by exploiting the rural sector, and this was exactly why 
the registration system carried with it systematic discrimination against peasants, which 
persists into the reform era where a large flock of peasants are crowding into the cities. 
In terms of social welfare, the registration system excluded the peasants from benefiting 
from the privileges entitled to urban residents. For peasants, there was no public housing, 
food and utility allowances whatsoever, leave alone the public medicare and retirement 
benefits. So, during the first two decades of the reform, the peasants that were working in 
the cities were almost completely left out by the social welfare system. In 2005, a survey 
shows 80% of the employers were not willing to cover their migrant workers by old-age 




In terms of legal status, the residence registration system led to the systematic 
discriminatory measures that deprive the migrant workers of legal protection. Prior to 1993， 
the 50 millions migrant workers frequently confronted dismissal of their complaints by the 
local governments. Though the enactment of 1994 Labor Law encodes the rights of 
migrant workers, the local regulations derived from the law are still fraught with 
discriminatory policies. For example, most labor regulations in Shenzhen discriminate 
against the migrant workers by defining them in a way that qualifies migrant workers only 
for temporary jobs which do not entail a formal contractual relationship with the employers. 
At the same time, the legal protection of temporary contracts is rather elusive in the 
regulation documents. 
In fact, a significant part of the effect that residence registration system has on the abject 
plight of migrant workers is mediated through the emerging two-tier labor market. The first 
tier is mainly a section of the market for jobs of higher pay and good benefits, while the 
second takes up the indecent jobs with poor working environment and meager pay. 
Obviously, the barrier between the two tiers is exactly the hukou. In most cases, migrant 
workers can only sign temporary contracts with the employers, and many municipalities 
have certain restrictions on the types of job that migrant workers are eligible to do. Even 
after these local discriminatory regulations were officially nullified by central government 
in 2003, the discrimination has continued. Instead of imposing a rigid restriction on 
recruiting migrant workers, the local governments opted for the underhanded policies that 
See Work Day Tianxun Online, retrieved at 21:29,2005.4.11, 09:29 
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intended to strike the similar effect. More often than not, local governments regulated the 
proportion of migrant workers in local enterprises, charged extra fees for enterprises 
recruiting migrant workers, and most importantly, disenfranchised the migrant workers of 
the right to use the public employment services. Under these circumstances, migrant 
workers were confined to the second tier of the caste-like labor market based on the 
residence registration system. In a nutshell, the residence registration system and the 
two-tier labor market have reinforced the exploitativeness of the labor regime in China. 
D. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
The above discussion summarizes the economic and socio-political institutional causes 
that led to the impoverishment and marginalization of the working class in China. These 
causes present the major impetus that prodded the emergence of spontaneous social 
initiatives to protect the laborers. However, these spontaneous initiatives would not have 
acquired significance in the short run without the presence of a reinforcing factor, which is 
the corporate social responsibility in the western civil society where consumers have 
become increasingly conscious of the inhuman labor practice 
I. The comeback of CSR 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, major transnational corporations (MNCs) have been 
more and more involved in a social movement originating from a renewed concept of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Nike, along with numerous other American and 
European firms that produce footwear, sporting equipment began to monitor working ) 
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conditions in its supplier factories in developing countries; Ikea requires its rug suppliers in 
India to prohibit the employment of children and provides families with financial 
assistance to help keep their children out of the labor market; British Petroleum has 
significantly reduced its greenhouse gas emissions; Shell adopted policies to address 
human rights and environmental abuses associated with its investments in developing 
countries; Timberland allows its employees to take one week off with pay each year to 
work with local charities. These are just a few examples of a recent global "fashion" that 
has acquired increasing significance in the world of corporates which deem profit-seeking 
as no longer possible to be the only purpose of their existence. Instead, a "business virtue" 
became an inevitable part of their working agenda. As Thomas Donaldson correctly 
pointed out, "[i]n a globalized market economy, CSR is part of a modem business"/^ 
The principle of CSR dates back to more than a century, but its formal writing is largely a 
product of the century, especially last fifty decades/^ In Howard Bowen's 1953 
landmark book Social Responsibilities of Businessmen, CSR refers to "the obligation of 
businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of 
action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society". This 
definition provides a conceptual instrument for the legislations in western societies that 
established limits to capitalist expansion and profit-making so as to protect social and 
environmental rights and make corporations and entrepreneurs liable for the social impact 
of their decisions. 
” Financial Times, June 2, 2005 
78 A Carroll’ Corporate Social Responsibility, Business and Society, Vol.38, No.3, 1999, pp.268-295 
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The major resurgence of interest in CSR took place in the 1960s and 1970s, with the 
current of ideas on CSR expanding and strategies of civil regulation developing. 
Committee for Economic Development (CED) made a publication that articulates three 
concentric circles of social responsibility: (a) an inner circle of basic responsibilities, 
including job creation and economic growth; (b) an intermediate circle of sensitive 
awareness to societal values and priorities; and (c) an outer circle of "newly emerging and 
still amorphous responsibilities", among which the author mentions poverty and urban 
blight.79 S Prakash Sethi further detailed the three concentric parts of social responsibility 
by breaking down CSR into three distinctive parts: (a) "social obligation", which refers to 
corporate behavior in response to market forces and legal constraints; (b) social 
responsibility, which refers to prescriptive and entails corporate performance in line with 
social values and expectations; and (c) social responsiveness, or corporate prevention and 
anticipation of social needs and environment threats.岔。The development of CSR concept 
went in tandem with the innovation of regulations of corporate behaviors. Aside from 
legislative regulations, the civil society began to take a prominent role in holding 
corporations accountable through publishing assessments and rankings of corporate social 
and environmental performance and organize public interest proxy resolutions. In response, 
corporations began to take some voluntary actions such as formulating codes of conduct, 
conducting social audits and establishing social investment funds. But after all, the 
voluntariness of corporations in exercising their social responsibilities was a product of 
social pressure associated closely with consumer demand, and this demand brought CSR 
into a sensational social movement on a global scale in the 1990s, where multinational 
'"Ditto. 
S Prakash Sethi, "Dimensions of Corporate Social Performance: An Analytical Framework." California Management 
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corporations such as Nike began to pioneer the development of a CSR labor regulatory 
regime. 
11. CSR labor regulatory regime 
The CSR labor regulatory regime is in essence a type of nongovernmental governance 
regarding labor practices of transnational corporations. It comprises mainly of two 
elements of which variations exist: code of conduct and monitoring system. 
Code of conducts. The global labor regulatory regime is based on voluntary standards, 
usually embodied in codes of conduct that specify norms and rules whereby to evaluate 
factory performance. Many large brands and retailers have their own codes, but the recent 
trend is their adoption of several codes formulated by NGOs. Codes of conduct were 
originally quite diverse, but now appear to be converging around the ILO core standards 
and basic principles with respect to the protection of health and safety, wages and hours, 
and treatment of women. Nevertheless, the details of the codes still vary considerably. 
Table presents a summary of the codes of conduct advanced by the four primary U.S. 
monitoring systems. 
Monitoring system. For codes of conduct to be effective, a system for implementing and 
assessing code compliance are evidently crucial to the credibility of these codes. Basically 
speaking, two subtypes of monitoring system are practiced, being complementary to each 
other. 
Review Spring: 1975’ 58-64 
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The first subtype is the corporation internal compliance monitoring. Many big brands and 
retailers, such as the Gap, Levi's Disney, Walmart, H&M, have developed procedures for 
monitoring supplier compliance with their codes of conduct. Corporations might either 
incorporate this monitoring system into the existing line departments or create entirely new 
office for internal monitoring and evaluation. Nike made one of the earliest attempts in the 
apparel and footwear industries to establish the internal compliance division, the Labor 
Practice Department. In 1992 Nike created a code of conduct on labor and environmental 
practices for its network of supplies. Supplier compliance with the code is monitored 
through a program of internal evaluation conducted first by Nike staff and then reviewed 
by external accounting, health, safety and environmental consulting firms. Similar 
arrangements exist at Reebok and Adidas, Nike's main competitors, together with other 
prominent footwear and apparel companies. However, the internal compliance method is 
subject to criticisms that the process is industry-dominated and susceptible to corporate 
manipulation, and that the codes and monitoring have been used for public relations rather 
than for improving labor conditions.^' 
The second subtype relies on external players in conducting monitoring and enforcement 
of the codes. This system was a product of growing public awareness of limitation of 
corporation internal compliance system, and of activist pressure pressing for an 
independent role in monitoring contractors. In consequence, three major external 
compliance systems have emerged in the United States that established standardized 
distinct codes of conduct and corresponding systems of monitoring: FLA, SAI (SA8000) 
See Dara O'Rourke, Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of corporate third-party labor monitoring, in R. Jenkins, R. 
Pearson and G. Seyfang (eds.)’ Corporate Responsibility and Labor Rights: Codes of Conduct in the global economy, 
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and WRAP. 
Fair Labor Association (FLA) grew out of the Apparel Industry Partnership initiated by the 
Clinton Administration in 1996 as a response to allegations of sweatshop conditions both 
in the U.S. and overseas. It had its focus placed initially on the apparel and footwear 
industries, but later expanded to other sectors producing university-logo goods. By 2006, it 
consisted of twenty corporate participants with global presence and 194 collegiate 
affiliates. SA8000 is a code designed by Social Accountability International, a 
non-governmental organization dedicated to improving workplaces and communities by 
developing and implementing socially responsible standards.SA8000 is a voluntary 
standard for workplaces, based on ILO and UN conventions - which is currently used by 
businesses and governments around the world and is recognized as one of the strongest 
workplace standards. Similarly, WRAP is a code designed by Worldwide Responsibe 
Apparel Production, an independent, non-profit organization dedicated to the certification 
of lawful, humane and ethical manufacturing throughout the world. These three major 
codes of conduct are, in fact, the target of ICO in its pursuit of a status as a certified 
independent auditor. 
III. The story of ICO started from here 
The emergence of the CSR-oriented labor regulatory regime in the global context 
ultimately transferred its impact into China by virtue of the multinational corporations that 
began to enforce their CSR-informed codes of conduct in their vast network of suppliers in 
the China's export-oriented manufacturing sector. So, while China's involvement in the 
(London:Earthscan) 
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global economy is the culprit of the poor labor practice rife in the workplace, which is 
further reinforced by China's domestic socio-political institutions, it nevertheless brought 
with it a possibility of change. This possibility of change is exactly what migrant worker 
social organizations such as ICO capitalize on for the sake of their growth and the cause of 
labor practice improvement. 
E. Summary 
The emergence of social organizations working for migrant workers in China took place in 
the context of an exploitative labor regime that facilitates China to fit in the global 
capitalism by virtue of its export-oriented industry, the lower-end of the global supply 
chain. The buyer driven nature of the supply chain subjects the suppliers in China to fierce 
competition, not only among themselves, but also from their counterparts in other 
developing countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia. The pursuit of competitiveness 
prompts the suppliers to adopt harsh labor policies in the workplace. To top it off, the 
migrant workers are further marginalized by the socio-economic underpinnings embodied 
in the residence registration system and the two-tier labor market which bring with them 
systematic discrimination against migrant workers in the cities. 
Interestingly, while the global capitalism proved to be rather effective in encroaching on 
the labor rights in developing countries, it might be just as effective in working the other 
way around. As the agents of global capitalism, the multinational corporations (MNCs) are 
found to enforce CSR policies in their suppliers. If the dire situation of labor presents an 
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institutional impetus for spontaneous associational activities to arise, the presence of 
MNCs makes them grow. 
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Chapter Five: The Emergence of ICO in the Context of CSR 
This chapter presents an in-depth description and analysis of the first two years' 
development of the featured case: ICO. This chapter starts with a brief review on the 
government's legal control over social organizations ever since the CCP took power in 
1949. The evolution of state's regulatory framework carries with it important messages of 
subtle changes in the state's attitude to the civil society. The understanding of state attitude 
will help make sense of the strategy that ICO took to get involved in the industrial relations, 
which becomes the second and third part of the chapter. The second part focuses on the 
registration process that ICO went through before its official establishment, and the third 
part discusses the initial strategy of ICO to lay down a solid foundation for its future 
development into the CSR related activities. However, the interaction between the state 
and ICO just tells one part of the story. After a separate discussion of the government's role 
in the first stage of ICO's development, this chapter will look at how foreign NGOs have 
impacted the ICO's operation. 
A. Historical Review of Government Control on Social Organizations 
The regulation of social organizations in China features a three-phase history. The legal 
framework was initially established in September 1950 in the form of the passage of 
Provisional Measure on the Registration of Social Organization by the State Council 
(Goiiwuyuan), and the now defunct Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible for the 
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registration of social organizations. The formulation of these regulatory documents was an 
attempt by the CCP to untangle the messy sphere of social organizations that survived from 
the republican era. These social organizations included commercial associations, trade 
unions and some political-oriented organizations, such as Nine-three Society (Jiusan 
Xueshe) and China Democratic Ally (zhongguo minzhu tongmeng). The regulation 
disbanded the extant anti-revolutionary social organizations and prohibited the registration 
of the ones that government deemed as subversive. However, the legal document did not 
explicitly stipulate the requirements that an applicant social organization must fulfill 
before it could be registered. Except for an explicit stipulation that required social 
organizations to follow the party's leadership, this legal framework did not establish a 
structural role of the party in the supervision of social organizations' operation, an 
institutional weakness of which many autonomous social organizations emerging during 
the 1980s took advantage. 
The 1950s legal framework obtained throughout the pre-reform era and continued its legal 
effectiveness till 1989，but in reality, it lost its effectiveness during the Cultural Revolution 
with the abolition of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Despite that the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs took over the responsibility in 1977，the 1950s legal documents remained in 
abeyance till 1989. The 1950s regulatory framework defined the types of social 
organization and the formal procedures for registration that featured a center-province 
dichotomous structure for management of social organizations. That is to say, the national 
social organizations were required to register with the central government and local ones 
with local governments. This structural feature left its imprint on the contemporary China's 
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legal framework that was set up in 1989. 
The 1989 turmoil raised the government's awareness of the necessity to replace the 1950s 
legal regulations. The crisis of that year took the government by surprise. Several 
autonomous social organizations, such as independent student organization and workers 
federation displayed impressive capability of mobilization. The new regulation was issued 
in October by the Committee of State Council in the document of the Management 
Regulations on the Registration of Social Organizations {Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli 
Tiaoli) . This document built into the regulatory framework a structural role of the 
government in the supervision of social organizations by virtue of a requirement of 
affiliation (guakao). According to the document, social organizations to register with the 
government shall affiliate to a supervisory body (guakao danwei), which was responsible 
for overseeing the day-to-day affairs of its dependent associations. So, the mechanism of 
affiliation is in essence a form of corporatist licensing. ^^  
In 1998, "Democratic Party Incidence" turned out to be another watershed in the 
• • • 33 
evolvement of legal framework that aimed to regulate the development of civil society. 
This irregularity in the development of social organizations led to another attempt of the 
party to rein in the civil society impetus. The Ministry of Civil Affairs revised the 1989 
regulations into Regulations on Regulation and Management of Social Organizations, a 
policy that rendered the registration process more stringent. The document specified the 
82 Similarly, the stipulation in the regulations that there can be only one organization for one particular interest or 
constituency is a classic corporatist feature. 
In 1998，a group of university activists formed the Democratic Party which incurred the harsh crackdown by the CCP. 
See Teresa Wright, China Democracy Party and the Politics of Protest in the 1980s - 1990s, The China Quarterly, 2003, 
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role of the sponsoring institution and raised the requirements, time and procedure 
necessary for registration. The sponsor is also required to examine whether the founding of 
social organization corresponds to an actual need and make sure that it not overlap with 
other organizations with similar functions and that its members have the capability of 
running the organization. Moreover, the sponsor should make sure that the social 
organization abides by the law and is itself held responsible for the organization's actions. 
The sponsor is held responsible for all preliminary reviews of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
to register the social organization to carry out preparatory work，* And the length of time 
before a social organization can actually carry out activities has been increased from 30 to 
90 days. 
So, on the surface, China's social organizations have witnessed a process of regulatory 
tightening in the reform era, and each step towards a tighter regulation was the state's 
response to the radical move of the civil society. Fortunately, as tight as the regulations 
have become, the state's intention to tap the resources of the society remains unchanged. It 
is only that the state wants to make sure that this calculated intention will not backfire to 
jeopardize the CCP's rule, but just as certain is the state's flexibility in its policy towards 
spontaneous social initiatives. The continual adjusting of existent legal framework shows 
exactly the uncertainty that the state has on the issue of the civil society development. On 
the one hand, this uncertainty may render social spontaneous activities rather risky; on the 
other, it provides huge room for social actors to explore the boundaries given the right 
strategy. On this, ICO presents a perfect example. 
84 See State Council, Regulations on Regulation and Management of Social Organizations, 1998 
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B. The Strategy of ICO to Register with the Government 
The 1989-1998 regulations make the registration of a social organization a rather 
complicated process, and it is no exception with ICO. The official establishment of ICO 
dates back to March 18, 2001. Different from other migrant worker social organizations, 
ICO was a product of a concerted effort of several well educated social activists that 
brought with them different background and network, both being much coveted resources 
to which a marginalized interest social organization would aspire. Liu Kaiming, head of 
ICO, is a Ph.D in literature from Nanjing University, and worked as journalist specializing 
in the reportage of migrant workers for several years. Wang Ying, Liu's wife, was the CEO 
of an advertisement company located in Shenzhen. Huang Jianyuan, Ph.D in history from 
Nanjing University, used to be a well published college professor. His research had been 
focused on civil society development in China. In 1999, he began to work for Xinhuan 
Daily as editor-in-chief and journalist. Zhou Tao, a master degree holder, was the Board 
Director of an electronic appliance firm. Before this, he led several companies and was 
experienced in investment management, corporate governance, stock option incentive 
design, and e-commerce. These four people constituted the leadership of ICO at the eve of 
its establishment. As competent as this leadership might be, their strong networks did not 
make the registration process any easier. 
The process prior to the registration was a painstaking and time-consuming experience. Liu 
and his colleagues were initially open to the types of entity they would later register with 
the government. It was not that they had no idea of what the registration process would be, 
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but that Huang Jianyuan, based on his seasoned research background in China's civil 
society development, only knew too well that registration of a social organization -
especially the ones organized around marginalized interest such as migrant workers - was 
subject to tight regulation, and that the ultimate option they took might well be a choice of 
no choice. But before any networking actions were taken, ICO's leadership did weigh each 
option against one another. The benefit of registering as a civil non-enterprise obviously 
appealed in terms of the tax break they are legally permitted to enjoy,^^ Most importantly, 
ICO defined itself as a social organization committed to services for migrant workers, 
which fit it well into the civil non-enterprise category. The disadvantage, however, was that 
the supervisory body to which social organization or civil non-profit enterprise is affiliated 
is likely to interfere with its operation. 
This possibility of interference is created not only by the clause in the regulatory 
documents that require the existence of a supervisory body for the social organization, but 
also by the undocumented rule that at least one actual leading member (the president or the 
executive vice-president) of the social organization has to be a leading official of the 
supervisory body.^^ Usually, the position of general secretary of the social organization is 
most likely to be taken by an official from the latter, an arrangement that facilitates the 
management of the former's operation. Moreover, the administrative structure of the social 
organization is incorporated into that of the supervisory body. In most cases, the social 
organization does not need regular staff and a separate office. Its administrative and liaison 
work are carried out by the administrative staff of the supervisory body. Personal and 
State Council, Regulations of Levying Income Tax for Government Sponsored Units, Social Organizations and Civil 
non-enterprises, 1999 
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structural changes of the latter are likely to cause corresponding changes in the former. So, 
this structural incorporation detracts from the autonomy of the social organization. 
Nevertheless, the structural incorporation is not unavoidable given the right strategy of the 
social organization. Jude Howell's field research revealed how some social organizations 
in China have maneuvered to minimize the role of supervisory body in their daily operation 
for the sake of preserving their independence.^^ The general strategy is to find right 
supervisory organizations, with sufficient confidence in the work of affiliated organization 
to take a hand-off approach. The Yunnan Reproductive Health Association, for example, 
reflected carefully on the choice of its supervisory organization. It ruled out a prestigious 
professional association in fear that the latter would impose their control. Rather, it decided 
to approach a dormant research institute that agreed to let the health association have its 
way in return for their papers being published in the name of the research institute. With 
this agreement, the health association was almost left unfettered in its activities. 
Therefore, to some extent, having a "friendly" supervisory body to cover ICO would be an 
acceptable option for Liu and his colleagues. So, they fanned out from their office and 
began to tap on their connections with the government officials. The result was not 
promising. The contacts in Shenzhen Municipal Committee and municipal government 
were not able to find a supervisory organization for them. They confided that although they 
would like to be of help, but that ICO's function overlaps with one of the existent 
organization registered under Shenzhen Municipal Cadre School. Moreover, one official 
This information is derived from the interview with Liu Kaiming. 
87 See Jude Howell, New Directions in Civil Society: Organizing around Marginalized Interests, in Jude Howell (ed.), 
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said that the sporadic worker unrest in several Guangdong cities caused led the government 
to be rather cautious with social organization aimed at labor condition improvement. The 
failure to find a sponsor meant the option closed off for ICO to register as civil 
non-enterprise. 
This, however, did not discourage the leadership of ICO at all. For one thing, the result was 
not completely unexpected. For another, they did not see civil non-enterprise as the safest 
method of registration for ICO. Liu said that at the very outset, they were concerned about 
the political risk in operating under a supervisory body. The sensitiveness of migrant 
worker issue would be very likely to render the 'deal', if any, between ICO and its 
supervisory organization, ineffective when the right advocacy activities irritated the 
government. If that ever happened, the supervisory body would have no choice but to exert 
its paternalistic influence on ICO's activities, and the leadership of ICO would be very 
likely to be replaced by fiat. This, Liu said, was the last thing they wanted to see. 
Now that the "legal" method could not apply to ICO, Liu and his colleagues, inspired by an 
official of the local government, opted for a registration as a business entity under the 
industrial and commercial bureau. As common as the strategy had been, the legal 
framework instituted in 1997-98 preempted such a possibility by virtue of the creation of 
civil non-profit enterprise, which subsumed any public-oriented business under this 
category. However, this time, ICO leadership's network in government paid off. The 
official in Shenzhen Industrial and Commercial Bureau promised that he would give it a 
shot, after ICO filed the application document that stated ICO's main business area was 
Governance in China, (Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004) 
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human resource consulting. In fact, consulting was indeed the "business" that ICO would 
be doing, since its most important activity later revolved around the enforcement of 
corporate social responsibility in the workplace. The method worked out at last, and 
government approval was granted. 
C. The ICO's Strategy into the Industrial Relations 
ICO's leadership had in mind a vision for the organization at the time of its founding. Liu 
attempted to develop ICO into a nationwide organization working to enforce the corporate 
social responsibility in the China's enterprises. This ambition could not be made sense of 
without the understanding of the global trend that requires the transnational corporations to 
take the responsibility for their labor practice in their sourcing enterprises in the developing 
countries, which was discussed in the previous chapter. And the mechanism thus 
established to enforce CSR has involved a greater role for civil society in order to ensure 
that the corporations' actions comply with their promises. Fair Labor Association (FLA), 
for example, makes compulsory the participation of local NGOs in the monitoring of labor 
practice of sourcing enterprises. At the same time, many international donors began to 
channel CSR project-specific funds into qualified civil society organizations around the 
world. 
ICO was well aware of what had been happening at the time when its leadership decided to 
establish this organization. There were two major causes of concern at the preparatory 
phase. First, Liu and his colleagues found it inevitable to rely on international funds to 
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break the bottleneck effect that plagued most migrant worker social organizations in their 
development. So, the question is how ICO could successfully attract donors' attention. 
Second, the reliance on international donors when ICO operates without the supervision of 
the government could involve huge political risk, which ICO would have to figure out a 
strategy to hedge. In other words, ICO confronted a dilemma in its initial strategy. 
With respect to the first cause of concern, ICO leadership opted for a strategy that focused 
their limited resources on conducting researches on South China labor conditions. In fact, 
prior to Liu's initiative to set up ICO, he had already been an experienced journalist in 
researching and reporting on labor rights violation in South China enterprises. In particular, 
his research and advocacy work on labor rights of occupational injury compensation 
brought him a reputation in the field. On February 20, 2001, he was invited to deliver a 
speech on poverty eradication at a conference sponsored by the World Bank. The speech 
was published on People 's Daily and World Bank Weekly. Liu's public exposure in the early 
years helped Liu establish a loosely-knit network in the global private and NGO sector, 
which proved extremely helpful for the later development of ICO. 
Three months after ICO was founded, which was June 2001, it received its first funding 
from Oxfam Hong Kong which was dedicated to the research on migrant worker injury 
claims. An employee working in Oxfam Hong Kong said that they knew of Liu and his 
effort ill the field of labor rights. She said that they were impressed by his researches in 
South China. This funded project was an extension of Liu's previous research at the time 
when he was a journalist. In 1998, he followed Zhou Litai, a legendary lawyer helping 
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migrant workers sue against their employers for occupational injury compensation, in the 
lawsuit he filed on behalf of a dozen of injured migrant workers. The subsequent reportage 
on the newspaper that he was the working for attracted nationwide attention to labor 
conditions in Shenzhen. In 1999, in collaboration with Sun Fuhai, then the journalist from 
Workers ‘ Daily, Liu paid visits to factories and hospitals to investigate the occupational 
injury situation. Their report was filed to the central government in the form of an internal 
reference, which led to the formulation of a document issued collectively by several 
bureaus of the State Council that required enterprises to ensure the health and safety of 
workers. The funding by Oxfam made possible an in-depth research based on the 600 cases 
Zhou Litai represented on behalf of the workers. The research uncovered the disadvantages 
of the injured workers during the legal process due to the discrimination institutionalized 
against the working class.. 
In the same year of its founding, ICO hired two newly-minted university graduates for the 
sake of another research on migrant workers' dormitory conditions, which was funded by 
Pentland, a British sportswear company. The research was conducted in the enterprises of 
Pentland's contractors located in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhongshan and 
Quanzhou, etc. Liu's team interviewed 216 workers, investigated their living conditions in 
the factories, categorized the types of dormitory, and checked their facilities and 
management methods. The research was intended to ferret out the problems of migrant 
workers' dormitory, and based on that, attempted to set a dormitory standard against which 
transnational corporation buyers could measure their contractors. 
84 
In October, ICO was invited by the Contemporary China Study Center at Tsinghua 
University in its empirical research on the impacts that the codes of conduct had on 
Chinese society. This collaborative project introduced Liu to Ford Foundation that was 
funding a set of projects of the center on labor research, and paved way for later direct 
cooperation of ICO with the Foundation. The project compared enterprises' labor practice 
before and after their application of the codes, such as SA8000, and evaluated the 
effectiveness of monitoring system instituted by the transnational corporations From 
October 2001 to March 2002, surveys and interviews were conducted by the research team, 
targeting transnational corporation CSR officials, supply chain managers, workers, 
government officials and consumers. The research was completed in June 2002, and 
published in January 2003. The findings were encouraging. The codes of conduct did 
translate into the enhancement of labor standard in the workplace. 
This research proved to be a landmark in the chronicle of ICO history. First, CSR thematic 
research provided ICO a direct exposure of the CSR enforcement in China, rendering ICO 
a pioneer in the field of CSR enforcement among migrant worker social organizations. 
Second, the research provided ICO with an opportunity to make its preliminary contacts 
with several famous brands that were outsourcing extensively in China. In December, ICO 
successfully won the support from Nike, Adidas, Reebok, Sears and Li & Fimg to conduct 
an in-depth investigation in search for an optimal mechanism for the creation of the 
workplace ombudsman whereby workers were empowered in the supervision of the 
management in its maintenance of labor standards. This project confirmed the success of 
ICO's initial strategy and laid the foundation for ICO's later cooperation with these 
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companies in the field of codes of conduct enforcement in the sourcing enterprises. As Liu 
admitted it, this project symbolized ICO's successful entry into CSR related activities -
such as labor condition evaluation, auditing, supervision, training and consulting - that 
began to gain more and more significance in China due to the advocacy of numerous 
NGOs and multinational corporations. Good empirics. 
As it moved into its second year of operation, ICO leadership shifted part of its focus to 
innovative actions to protect labor rights. The adjustment in strategy was a corollary to the 
organizational objective to promote its image as a local NGO committed to labor rights 
protection and also to the increasing resources it began to receive from some of the 
international donors and transnational corporations. Here, the resources were not narrowly 
understood in financial terms. More important is the network that the ICO had established 
in its first year of operation. Of course, ICO still committed much energy to researches on 
migrant workers and enterprises labor practices, because Liu believed that only by 
adopting a combined strategy can ICO be more attractive for donors and corporations so 
that it could break the bottleneck that had stunt the growth of many other social 
organizations in China. 
The expertise that ICO earned from the project in the previous December led to ICO's 
cooperation with Yunnan Community Development Research Center, Guangdong 
Academy of Social Science, and Pentland in a joint project in five of the Pentland sourcing 
factories that, by virtue of participatory evaluation of the workplace labor standard, aimed 
to enhance communication mechanism between management and workers, and to establish 
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the workplace ombudsman. Liu was excited when talking about this project. 
Unsurprisingly, the project marked another success of Liu and his colleagues' strategy of 
getting ICO into the dynamic field of CSR advocacy not simply as a researcher but also as 
a practitioner. This hand-on experience promoted ICO's image as a vanguard among social 
organizations in the field of industrial relations. 
D. Government 
In the case of ICO in its first two years of development, the role of government was not 
very clear-cut. Certainly, personal connections within the government did help the ICO 
figure out a feasible method to register with the government. Of course, the failure to find a 
sponsor indicated government's reluctance to facilitate social initiatives to take on 
organizational features. But ultimately, ICO's operation as a de facto NGO in the form of a 
business entity did signal the government's acceptance of its activities. This attitude of 
government towards migrant worker social organizations does not seem to be idiosyncratic. 
In the case of DSD, it had the same experience with the government at its initial stage of 
operation as well. Registering with the government as the self-employed business, the 
government accepted the reality of DSD being a social organization committed to legal 
service for migrant workers. 
In certain cases, the government displayed a particular intention to tender the growth of 
social organization working for migrant workers. In September of that year, ICO won the 
open bid from the Shenzhen Fifth Census Office alongside the Chinese Social Sciences 
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Academy (CSS A) to conduct a research based on the results of the fifth census of Shenzhen. 
The research turned into a collaborative publication by the Census Office and ICO, where 
they proposed to improve on the social mobility mechanism to optimize the structure of 
work force, to commit public resources to social welfare without discrimination based on 
hukou, to encourage the social initiatives in welfare provision, and to make urban 
development plan for migrants. Although the project was an open bid, the government 
might well have chosen an official background social organization, rather than ICO. This 
corroborates what He Jianyu's finding in his Ph.D dissertation that the government was 
assigning more attention to the growth of spontaneous social organization. ^^  
This government attitude reflects both the state's recognition of the need to liberalize 
spaces for association to facilitate the development of the market and its anxiety about the 
threat that a rising civil society would pose to it. This is a dilemma that the state has to live 
with in the process of economic reform. On the one hand, the continued economic growth 
brought by the role that market has been playing in the economy is vital to underpin the 
legitimacy of the authoritarian rule of the CCR This will entail further lay-offs, downsizing 
of government bureaucracy and shedding of more government functions, and the 
export-oriented nature of economy will also inevitably subject a large number of wage 
laborers to the exploitation by the export sector to survive the throat-cutting competition. 
This creates the need to expand the social organization sector to take on these functions on 
behalf of the state; otherwise the likelihood of social unrest will increase. Of this, the party 
leadership was well aware. Jiang Zemin, the former general party secretary, stress the 
Jianyu He, Modernization, Marketization, Policy Fluctuation and Development of Civic Associations: Political 
Economy of Associational Revolutions in China, Ph.D Dissertation, (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006) 
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imperative, in his speech to the Party Congress, to cultivate and develop what he 
termed "social intermediary organizations" as the reform program proceeded.^^ By social 
intermediate organization, Jiang was referring indirectly to the civil society organizations 
or NGOs. Luo Gan, State Councilor and secretary general of the State Council, complained 
that many problems that should have been dealt with "by legal means or through social 
intermediary organizations" had been taken on by government. Luo said that "government 
has taken up the management of many affairs which it should not have managed, is not in a 
position to manage or actually cannot manage well."^® Luo thought that the overload 
detracted from the government's capacity to get its work done effectively, so he 
encouraged "social intermediary organizations" to develop and expand. This reasoning 
was echoed by a rising discourse of governance in the domestic academia and among 
western China study scholars as well? ' Underlying this discussion on governance is 
exactly the connotation of involving the society in the governance process, which used to 
be monopolized by the state. 
Nevertheless, the state has always been wary of the presence of a powerful civil society, 
especially after the 1989 political crisis, and the suspicion was reinforced by the incident of 
Democracy Party Incident. The formulation of 1998 regulations was exactly a reassertion 
of the fact that this was not a free society for all and that the state would still want to have 
its control placed on the development of civil society. The crackdown of Democracy Party 
and arrests of its participants certainly would not be a surprise for those who have an 
89 Jiang Zemin, Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an all around Advancement of the cause of 
Buidling Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21®' century, Beijing Review, 6-12 October 1997’ pp. 10-33 
卯 Luo Gan, Explannation on plan for institutional restructuring of the State Council - delivered at the first session of the 
Ninth People's Congress on 6 March 1998, Dagong Bao, 7 March 1998，pp.Bl-B2, translated in FBIS-China 98-068, 
March 9，1998 
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optimistic outlook for China's civil society development; after all, the fight for a pluralist 
party system was a premature choice of action. However, it would definitely be a surprise 
for them that many social organizations providing social welfare to groups not officially 
recognized as having the needs have been shut d o w n ^ For example, a discussion club for 
homosexual men was closed down in 1993 when its coordinator, Wang Yan, lost his job at 
the Ministry of Health. He was sacked for allegedly "advocating homosexuality and human 
rights" and the closure of the discussion group reflects official hostility to issue of 
homosexuality in China.^^ In 1996, the local government forced the closure of a battered 
woman organization in Shanghai. The organization was funded by a businessman as a part 
of his enterprise. However, the government deemed it improper for an individual to run 
such an institution rather than the government. 
Of course, recent years have seen a more open-minded government in granting its 
permission for social initiatives to engage in welfare provision in areas it used to 
monopolize, especially woman affairs and homosexuals in a slighter sense. As for labor 
issues, the government's attitude has always been cautious. This has a historical 
explanation, since workers have caused much trouble to the party ever since 1949. The 
presence of workers was crucial in almost every political movement such as the Hundred 
Flower Movement, Anti-rightist Movement, the Cultural Revolution, and 1989 political 
crisis.94 Almost every time some independent worker organization arose out of the cover of 
the official trade unions and fought for independent unionism. Therefore, the state has 
See Jude Howell, Governance in China, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) 
92 Tony Saich, Negotiating the State: the Development of Social Organizations in China, The China Quarterly, No. 161’ 
(Mar., 2000), pp.124-141 
Ibid. 
94 See Jackie Sheehan, Chinese Workers: A New History, (London: Routelege, 2001) 
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always kept a heavy hand on any organized actions by workers. In July 2006, a mass riot in 
sourcing factory for McDonalds and Disney led to the arrest of a dozen workers by the 
local police in Dongguan.^^ In April 2004, a Taiwan-owned sourcing footwear factory for 
Nike and Adidas witnessed a collective action taken by its workers in protest of the poor 
working conditions and pay delay got local police involved in the violent crackdown, and 
later the court sentenced five workers to prison. This also happened in Dongguaii.^ This 
state's heavy-handedness is indicative of its antipathy to workers' collective actions, and 
that may also explain the state's endorsement on the existence of social organization that is 
not organized by the workers themselves but by the outsiders such as the intellectuals in the 
case of ICO. 
E. Western Civil Society and Foreign NGOs 
The leadership of ICO was well aware at the very beginning that the foreign donors (in 
most cases, NGOs) would have a significant presence in the development trajectory of the 
organization. That was why it saw the need to take CSR as their focus of activities because 
foreign NGOs had been ready to commit resources to nurture a local NGO sector in 
developing countries to assist in the auditing and monitoring of the enforcement of codes 
of conducts in sourcing. In some sense, this has become a business due to its considerable 
profit, and this is why ICO has frequently been discredited by some labor social activists 
for its instrumentalism. 
China Labor Watch, July 29, 2006 
China Labor Watch, November 10，2004 
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In fact, foreign NGOs found their way into China in 1991 when a catastrophic flood raged 
in the Southern China. The Central government permitted for the first time in the PRC 
history to have the foreign aid agencies assist with relief work. This move reflected in part 
a financial need of the government during the natural disaster, and the huge amount of 
money raised in Hong Kong delivered a message to the government that there was a large 
pool of resources that could be tapped in future, especially after the reunification scheduled 
for 1997. 
However, as Jude Howell pointed out, the acceptance of foreign aid did not necessarily 
signal the softening of state's attitude towards foreign NGOs. The reasons Howell provided 
are threefold. First, the state had a lack of experience with foreign NGOs. Not once before 
1991 did the party accept the international aid from them during natural disasters. Second, 
the party had the concern that some of these organizations may be seeking either to 
proselytize the Christian faith, or promote democracy or organize opposition to the CCP. 
Third, which I think is irrelevant, there is a long standing suspicion of foreigners which 
dates back to the Opium Wars of Nineteen Century?? In retrospect, the first two reasons did 
hold some truth, but at present, may not do any longer. 
In the last fifteen years, foreign NGOs have been found actively involved in many 
educational and poverty eradication projects in China. Their much sought-after financial 
resources and expertise in the numerous fields have become increasingly important in the 
们 Jude Howell, NGO-State Relations in Post-Mao China, NGOs, in David Hulme and Michael Edwards (eds.). States 
and donors: too close for comfort?, (New York : St. Martin's Press in association with Save the Children; Basingstoke, 
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development of urban and rural areas. In fact, foreign NGOs have taken a dual track mode 
of strategy in operation in China. On the one hand, they deemed it necessary to endear them 
to the CCP by funding extensively on state-sponsored projects such as Project Hope 
Scheme, which was imitated by the Communist Youth League (CYL) through its 
sponsored organization "the China Teenagers' Association". A number of projects imitated 
by the Women's Federation (WF) were also funded by foreign NGOs through China 
Children and Teenagers' Fund that WF set up. The official Chinese Protestant Church also 
created the Amity Foundation for the funding purpose. The establishment of these 
subsidiary organizations was a typical move by the state to dilute the image of party in the 
presence of the project for the sake of attracting foreign funds, and at the same time, despite 
the knowledge of party's actual presence, foreign NGOs were willing to channel their 
funds to these projects in effort to reduce the CCP's vigilance to them, and prepare for their 
further involvement in China. On the other hand, foreign NGOs have also funded many 
underground marginalized interest social organizations, and this was especially 
pronounced in the early 1990s.^^ For example, Oxfam's early strategy was extremely 
radical in its tentative move in China. It funded and provided assistance to numerous 
underground female worker organizations in order to research the labor conditions in South 
China. It hired some talented maiden workers, equipped them with field research skills and 
dispatched them to factories to conduct researches. However, their experience with the 
government gradually tempered this radicalness in strategy. 
The ideological concern kept being an important factor that constrains foreign NGOs' 
Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997) 
98 Interview with a social activist who requested anonymity. 
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activities in China, and this concern seems to be more evident in the field of safeguarding 
marginalized interest, of which migrant workers are a part. The state has always been 
fearful of the collective actions that marginalized interest groups will take against the 
government. In the case of laborers, the speech of former president of ACTFU, Ji Mingbo, 
was indicative of government's anxiety about the political risk in the enforcement of CSR 
in China. He stressed that the clause that requires freedom of association and collective 
bargaining is likely to "let western enemies westernize China”.99 His language was too 
revolutionary to fit into the broad picture of China's deep involvement in the global 
economy, but it did deliver the message that the CCP will keep an eye on foreign NGOs in 
their activities on the soil of China. Nevertheless, the fast fact is that foreign NGOs' 
presence in China is already a recent ramification of globalization. In terms of the 
industrial relations, as Ji admitted, the involvement of NGO sector was "an inexorable 
trend" in the movement of CSR. 
In fact, CSR represents an opportunity for foreign NGOs to expand their activities in China 
in the industrial relations. As aforementioned, labor was and still is a sensitive issue in 
China; it impinges on the social stability that the CCP would do whatever to maintain, 
because that is the fundamental to a continual economic growth. But the fact that 
multinational corporations are themselves an important proponent for CSR under the 
pressure of civil society makes it unreasonable on the part of the CCP to keep hostile to the 
positive impacts on labor practices in many China's sourcing enterprises. It would be an 
economically rational choice to have the corporations to foot the bill to improve labor 
conditions, and at the same time, the CCP could rectify its notorious reputation in the 
Ji Mingbo, Speech on CSR Forum, (WTO Economic Guidance, November 3，2005) 
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international community for its poor domestic human rights conditions. One stone and two 
birds, it is definitely a favorable deal for the CCP. 
To enforce the CSR in China, however, foreign NGOs found it necessary to tap on local 
networks, and FLA code of conducts, for example, even makes it a compulsory 
requirement for local NGOs to participate in the monitoring process. Foreign NGOs are 
looking for a local NGO that is not only familiar with the local situations, but also has a 
network stretching out into local enterprises. ICO's research strategy was exactly aimed to 
achieve this purpose. By research, it was able to conduct field of work in enterprises, 
developing skills to deal with them, promote its image by publication of the researches, and 
weaving their network with enterprises.'oo To some extent, this is a competition among 
local NGOs. Foreign NGOs are channeling their resources to those that are most 
competitive, because their expertise and local experience would get the job done more 
efficiently and also because it is easy to monitor local NGOs' appropriate use of funds. The 
Windlock NGO Capacity Building Program, which will be discussed in the next chapter, 
was exactly an attempt taken by foreign NGOs to set up a transparent and effective 
governance mode to enhance local NGOs' capability of optimizing the usage of funds and 
to make external monitoring easier. 
F. Summary 
For the first two years of ICO,s operation, the strategicness of the ICO's leadership figured 
100 The politics ofjealousy seems to be a common symptom in the development of civil society in post-socialist countries, 
and the presence of foreign donors and NGOs is usually the cause of it. See Julie Hemment, The Riddle of the Third 
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tremendously in guiding the organization through its first phase of development. With a 
clear vision for its future, ICO's leadership opted to focus its limited resources on 
researches to win the attention from the MNCs and foreign NGOs that were in search of 
high potential candidates to delegate their CSR projects. The attitude of the government 
was ambiguous towards ICO's establishment, but certain government official did 
contribute to the organization's founding. Basically speaking, the ambiguity in government 
attitude reflects exactly the flexibility in government's policy on the development of civil 
society in China. 
Sector: Civil Society, International Aid, and NGOs in Russia, Anthropological Quarterl)，77.2 (2004) 215-241 
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Chapter Six: The Expansion of ICO 
This chapter continues where the previous chapter leaves off, discussing the third and 
fourth year in the ICO's history. In this second phase of ICO's development, there was an 
adjustment in the organization's strategy since its success in researches had brought to it 
the resources that it had not possessed. The first two sections of this chapter focus on the 
activities and the management reform of ICO respectively. The rest of the chapter captures 
the roles that the government, enterprises and trade unions have played in the ICO's second 
phase of development. 
A. Strategy in adaptation 
I. Research 
Into the second stage of ICO's development, ICO began to bear fruit from its initial 
strategy of committing its limited resources to researches. This year saw a continual 
publication of the researches that ICO had conducted both independently and jointly with 
i 
domestic institutions and foreign NGOs during the past two years. In January, Liu 
published his first book Migrant Labor in South China, based on his experience of working 
on labor rights. Liu focused on the case of Shenzhen, showing how migrant workers 
contributed to the economic prosperity of the city while completely marginalized by the 
society. In the same month, the joint research project that ICO conducted with Tsinghua 
Contemporay China Research Center was published. Symbolically, this research helped 
ICO set its foot on field of CSR of transnational corporations, and the time of its 
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publication exactly marks a temporal watershed in ICO's development, in that from 2003 
on, ICO's strategy began to take on a systematic adjustment. 
Besides three international research projects to which ICO contributed its effort were also 
published, effectively promoting ICO's image in the international community of CSR. In 
August 2003，the ILO research for which ICO was responsible for the China part was 
officially published by ILO. In March 17'卜 2005, ICO's research report "Factories Life -
Nokia and its major Suppliers' labor conditions" was co-published with FinnWatch, a 
Finland-based human rights organization. The report accused of Nokia of massive 
violation of labor standards in its China's suppliers. 
The publication of these researches enhanced the reputation of ICO tremendously in the 
international community of labor issue NGOs. In some ways, these researches were the 
assets that ICO had accumulated in its first stage of development, and could be further 
deployed to bring in more returns in terms of networks and resources. So, ICO's success in 
research made it possible for the organization to expand its activities into an area that Liu 
had far earlier had envision ICO to enter: CSR. 
II. CSR Consulting, Training and Auditing 
The first two years of operation had in a sense opened a breach through which ICO could 
set its foot on the field of CSR advocacy. Liu and his colleagues were well aware of the 
merits of working on CSR as a social organization. First, as the global ideology of CSR had 
been reinforced during the last decade and the global trend was to involve the civil society 
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in the CSR implementation and monitoring, financial resources would become 
increasingly available for NGOs to make an impact. Second, the fact that CSR was mainly 
corporate actions, be it voluntary in nature or completely forced under the pressure of civil 
society and consumers, figures significantly in reducing the political risk associated with 
the operation of China's social organization without an official background. Working on 
CSR projects, ICO could legitimately refer to their activities as rendering a service for 
multinational corporations in fulfilling their social responsibility and justifies it by 
claiming to help local enterprises to win a competitive edge in the global market of 
outsourcing. This is not merely rhetoric, because it does reflect the reality that many 
China's export-oriented manufacturing sector has to face when international buyers begin 
to take into consideration the labor practices along their supply chain under the pressure of 
western civil society. No matter how unwilling they are, it seems to be a choice imposed on 
them to screen their suppliers and make sure of their compliance with some code of 
conducts. Certainly, Liu had this vision in mind when he founded ICO. In his own words, 
ICO would be 'a pioneer in the CSR field of China'. 
Based on the research experience in CSR and also on the initial network that ICO had 
established during the first two years of operation, it was able, from 2003 on, to expand its 
activities on the CSR practice, which usually includes three parts: CSR consulting, training 
and auditing. CSR consulting and training are more often than not a combined service that 
NGOs or private CSR auditing firms render to their clients. The service flow starts with the 
proposal of a plan to improve labor standards, and closes by training sessions for the 
management and workers to work the plan out. From January 2003, ICO began a training 
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project in Nike's sourcing factories in Guangdong and Shanghai that aimed to enhance the 
management's understanding of Chinese labor law and the codes of conduct and to prepare 
factories for a committed effort to enforce codes of conduct in their day-to-day operation. 
In addition to the introduction to the factory management of the global trend of CSR. Liu 
and his team placed an unequivocal emphasis on the fact that a well designed CSR 
implementation plan would not only be able to stand the factory in a good stead to compete 
for global buyers' production orders, but also to improve on the factory's productivity and 
efficiency. 
This latter justification for the necessity of CSR was derived from the ICO's strategy to 
promote its CSR-related services. This strategy was, in a way, indicative of Liu's 
entrepreneurship in bringing ICO along the way it had covered and would continue to 
cover in the future. The special stress Liu places on the productivity enhancement provides 
an incentive for the factories to hope for further cooperation with ICO. Not surprisingly, 
CSR implementation could be easily reduced to a fast-food-like image cleaning for local 
factories that would simply want to deliver a message of its effort to comply with the codes, 
however superficially even though in a superficial manner. Sometimes, half-hearted 
international buyers, as accused by the social activists, grant their acquiescent permission 
to their suppliers to merely do the cosmetic work for the sake of CSR. Liu said that the 
training project was usually an event of one or two days, a time span that almost every one 
of the ICO's activities related to CSR in China's sourcing factories would cover, as will be 
shown in the rest of this chapter. The short time span is partially defined by the resources 
that international buyers have offered, and to a lesser extent, by the limited human 
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resources that ICO could devote to it. Liu said that it was Nike that sketched up the 
schedule that ICO would follow in running the whole process in its outsourcing factories. 
This massive project that unfolded in many factories in Nike's suppliers in Guangdong and 
Shanghai was obviously a buyer dominated one. Later it will be shown that international 
buyers inevitably play a dominant role in the CSR implementation, but the point to be 
stressed here is that more often than not, suppliers simply take such training project as 
merely a routine work assigned by the buyer. That is exactly why Liu took the advantage of 
the training session to justify CSR as not solely a requirement imposed by the community 
of consumers, but also as an alternative method to improve the management and 
productivity. This leaves a room for ICO to further their collaboration with the factories. 
However, on the other hand, Liu was not very concerned about the short time-span that 
ICO could cover for each individual factory. It would be too hasty to refute the possibility 
that, this cooperation will help improve workplace labor relations, though the extent to 
which the improvement will actually materialize is indeed doubtful. Liu continued to stress 
survival as the major concern for ICO. Whatever strategy ICO takes to improve the labor 
standards in China, he confided, "survival is always the bottom line". Guided by this logic, 
it is reasonable to infer that at the early stage of CSR advocacy, a wide coverage of 
factories would be a necessary method to rapidly promote ICO's image in the field, and 
that is how ICO could attract international funding. In fact, this is exactly why Liu was 
criticized by many radical labor right activists as working for the money. A scandal that 
exploeded in the summer of 2004 almost drew Liu into a reputation crisis, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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In December 2003, ICO's experience in CSR training made it fully prepared to transform 
its ad hoc training mode into a systematic packaged program tailored for Chinese 
manufacturing enterprises that are part of supply chain of international buyers. 
Undoubtedly, this was an extremely creative initiative that responded to the demands in the 
rising market of CSR among the China's suppliers. Again, entrepreneurship is the most 
appropriate word to describe this originality. ICO advertised the new program mainly 
through its network with suppliers and MNCs, especially the latter. The flow of process 
usually begins with an interested MNC which decides to "buy" ICO's service for several 
designated suppliers. After receiving the order of service from MNCs, ICO would organize 
a team sent for to the factory, conduct an evaluation of its labor standards by way of 
communicating with managers and workers, and check on existent resources available to 
make improvements. Thereafter, a detailed plan is drafted stating improvement objectives 
and methods to achieve them, but as different as the objectives might be, the underlying 
principles are the same. ICO explicitly claims that the program intends to ameliorate 
communication mechanism for workers and management, improve production process and 
enhance managerial capacity. This is a consulting part of the program, followed by the 
implementation of the plan which ICO continues to play an important role. ICO would help 
work out the plan by running simulation workshops for both workers and management to 
adapt to the new system. This consulting and training process smack of what a human 
resource consulting would be doing in the similar situation. The only difference might be 
that ICO improves workplace labor standards but claims that this will not contradict with 
management's interest, while a human resources consulting firm work to harmonize 
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worker-management relations for the sake of more profits. But obviously, this difference is 
quite subtle. 
It seems necessary, here, to assess the extent to which this program helps improve 
workplace labor standards in the sourcing factories, but the lack of field research in this 
respect makes it unlikely to offer an evaluation, which is the limitation of this research. 
However, the point to be noted is that ICO began to show a clear sign of adopting a 
business mode for its activities in CSR advocacy, a result that was shaped by its motivation 
to promote its image as quickly as possible and by the limitation of resource as well. 
In order to promote its CSR training program, ICO tapped on its corporate, government 
and academic network to organize workshops around the China's coastline. These 
workshops were intended to introduce to local enterprises the global practice of CSR and 
inform them of the imperative to embrace it to remain their competitiveness along the 
global supply chain. On March 15-16 2004, ICO collaborated with Shenzhen General 
Commercial Union in a two-day training workshop attended by around 60 business leaders, 
factory managers, and human resources professionals. The workshop had representatives 
both from international NGOs such as BSR and SAI, and from MNCs like Nike and Adidas. 
The workshop highlighted the critical need for the Shenzhen business community to 
understand international labor standards in the framework of international and domestic 
laws and the trend of global supply chain management. Liu shared ICO's experience in 
helping enterprises to improve on workplace occupational safety mechanism, and again, 
without exception, Liu reiterated the CSR's value in increasing productivity. The 
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workshops were replicated in Bao'an and Longgang District, Shenzhen, respectively on 
July 6 and July 9, 2004. Nike's CSR compliance manager Shi Shaomiiig delivered a speech 
on Nike's experience in the implementation of the CSR, and Ma Ying, Asia compliance 
manager from SAI, introduced the application process of SA8000. 
This latter workshop is of critical value for the outsider to grasp how CSR is working out in 
the context of China. Usually, MNCs' presence is of central importance for such an 
occasion. Of course, it would put Liu in an unfavorable situation if he admits this fact. 
After all, it is in Liu's best interest to stress the role that ICO could play in leading the CSR 
advocacy as a real NGO in China, rather than being accused of as being led in the nose by 
corporate interests. But the corporate imprint was obviously indelible, as a social activist 
claimed that ICO has a pronounced leaning towards business interests, especially MNCs. 
However, it is not difficult to make sense of this dependence, though. It would be enough, 
here, just to mention that the marginalized interest social organizations are likely to have 
recourse to the business community for both resources and a cover from political risk. 
Discussion on this dependence culture has already been touched upon previously and will 
be detailed out further in this chapter. Back to the issue of ICO being dependent on MNCs, 
it is also necessary to mention that this dependence is not unilateral, as MNCs themselves 
are in need of a local NGO sector to enhance the creditability of MNCs in their pursuit of 
CSR and immunize them against common criticisms for their manipulation in the process 
by excluding the participation of civil society. 
Moreover, in this second stage of development, ICO displayed a strong tendency to strike 
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out of the geographic boundary and expand its presence across the country, and this reflects 
the ambition of ICO. In the early June 2004, ICO took their training program to Ningbo, 
Zhejiang province and Shanghai. The program was attended by 450 managers and 
workplace union leaders from 300 small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In September, 
the frontier was pushed to the north part of China, as ICO held seven training sessions in 
Jinan, provincial capital of Shangdong Province. Interestingly, while the government was 
found absent in ICO's training sessions held in Shenzhen, it was no longer the case in 
Ningbo, Shanghai and Jinan where local official trade unions became the sponsor for these 
training sessions. But with no exception, all these training sessions saw the presence of 
multinational corporations, in addition to academics, and local entrepreneurs. 
In the subfield of the CSR auditing, ICO made a great step forward in June 2003 when 
Kenan Institute Asia (K.I. Asia), a Thailand-based NGO, established a strategic partner 
relation with ICO. K.I. Asia provides assistance for SMEs located Greater Mekong 
Sub-region to achieve a balanced development in terms of productivity, profitability and 
corporate social responsibility. Moreover, it is a certified auditor for WRAP and FLA. By 
being a strategic partner with K.I. Asia, ICO was ultimately able to set its foot on the 
auditing service, the third pillar of CSR advocacy system. Under the guidance ofK.I. Asia, 
ICO piloted CSR auditing in ten sourcing factories located in Macao, Guangdong, Fujian, 
Zhejiang and Shandong Province in July, August and September 2003. In July 2004, 
Kenan arranged for FLA to hold FLA Audit Instrument and Tools Shenzhen Workshop 
where FLA representatives delivered a training session to 18 auditors from five 
organizations including ICO on auditing process and methods, problems need attention; 
105 
reporting. After that, FLA guided ICO's team to conduct an auditing in an apparel factory 
in Dongguaii, Guangdong Province. 
So, up to 2005, ICO had gradually developed its three-pillar CSR-related services: 
consulting, training and auditing. From the trajectory of this development, it is not difficult 
to see the calculated efforts that the leadership of ICO had made to achieve its ambition. 
III. Labor empowerment 
Labor empowerment is a politically sensitive area for migrant worker social organizations, 
since any activity that smacks of organizing workers is closely scrutinized by the 
government. So, it was not until the Mid-2002 that ICO made its first attempt in this aspect. 
In June, ICO set up a legal consulting service center for migrant workers. This was a 
well-meditated choice. Inspired by the experience of DSD, Liu and his colleagues reasoned 
that the government was willing to have workers resort to the legal method to deal with 
their complaints, since that way the government would retain a sense of control on labor 
relations through the court. It turned out that the center had worked out very well. With the 
funding from Oxfam, the service hired three employees with legal background to work full 
time in the center, responding to workers' inquiries either by telephone call or personal 
visits. The center would help workers get familiarized with the legal process and pick up 
cases to do the follow-up work. As of Mid-2005, the center had provided legal assistance to 
7000 migrant workers in 257 cases, and among them, 65% are women. The center helped 
workers to retrieve 4 million back pay. 
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Following the creation of the service center, ICO was able to take its labor empowerment a 
step further with the funding and support from University of California Berkeley (UC 
Berkeley). In March 2004, ICO cosponsored with UC Berkeley in launching a community 
college for migrant workers. The college represented an effort to provide continual 
education for migrant workers, foster their sense of citizenship, and bring about social 
cohesion. The college was staffed by a team comprised not only of professional teachers 
and qualified volunteers from both China and the US. ICO had a two-stage plan for this 
college at the time of its establishment. In the first stage, from 2004 to 2005, the college 
planned to set up two offices in Shenzhen and Dongguan respectively, together with a 
number of mobile classrooms. The second stage would see the expansion of the college 
into Zhongshan, Guangdong province, and Taicang, Jiangsu Province. Again, this is 
corroborative of Liu's vision of making ICO a NGO of national scale. Besides, the college 
adopted two modes of education based on community and individual enterprise 
respectively. Community-based education is conducted in classrooms that ICO arranged 
outside enterprises, but Liu said that ICO preferred enterprise-based education, because it 
was politically safe and financially desirable. Politically safe, because having a group of 
migrant workers gather in a place smack of "rallying workers for conspiracy", while 
workplace training minimizes the vigilance of the state due to the assumption that the 
government might well make about the management's endorsement of the training. 
Financially, ICO could spare the funds assigned to pay for classroom rents. 
To promote its enterprise-based continual education for workers, ICO held a promotion 
conference in Shenzhen. Unsuiprisingly, Nike was present in the conference with its 
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regional corporate responsibility compliance manager co-leading the conference with ICO 
on July 2，2004. Twenty suppliers in Guangdong province attended the conference. Among 
them, Guangdong Yida Textile, a major supplier for Nike and other international brands 
such as Reebok, CK and Hugo Boss, became the first to have invited ICO to design a set of 
courses for its workers in the Dongguan factory. 
In September 2004，ICO was invited by another supplier that had also participated in the 
July promotion conference to conduct a training project for its workers in its Dongguan 
factory which alone had 30,000 workers. Xingpeng International Holdings is a Hong Kong 
invested manufacturing company that established its first factory in the Mainland China in 
1992 and specialized in producing footwear for Nike, Adidas and Timberland, etc. Before 
the first stage of training started in September, ICO sent a team into the factory, and 
analyzed the workplace situation by surveys and interviews with workers and managers 
alike. Based on the information collected, ICO designed a two-month training composed of 
a set of courses such as occupational safety and health, personal hygiene and interpersonal 
communication, etc. 
IV. Networking 
ICO's success could provide a perfect textbook example to China's NGOs that shows the 
importance of networking. Ever since ICO was founded, Liu has made tremendous effort 
in attending conferences, either domestic or international, to get the organization involved 
in the community of foreign NGOs. For example, in March 2003, Liu and other two 
colleagues went to San Francisco, Washington DC, New York, Chicago, networking with 
108 
major labor research and service organizations. They paid visit to, University of Michigan, 
US-Sino Relations National Committee, Asia Foundation, Business Social Responsibility, 
SAI, FLA, Labor Rights Association. Liu met corporate responsibility officials from Levi's, 
Disney, and McDonalds, discussed about the methods to enforce CSR in China. This trip 
laid the foundation for ICO's later collaboration with several brands and SAI, whose 
project manager, Ma Ying, joined ICO as board member in 2004. 
In fact, in the second stage of ICO's development, Liu conceived a plan to expand the 
board into a more diversified one. As shown in Chapter Five, ICO's board was initially 
composed of people from media and local business. In 2004, following Ma Ying, Yeung 
Hauman, Associate Director from Assocition for Sustainable and Responsible Investment 
in Asia, also the CSR consultant of LESS, a private equity investment company, joined 
ICO as the seventh board member. This diversified board stepped up ICO's capability in 
networking, which brought ICO more funds and projects. 
B. Management and Capacity 
The peculiar political context has long curbed the growth of non-official social 
organizations in China, placing an insurmountable bottleneck that prevents their expansion 
in scale. So, effective governance is usually an irrelevant topic for China's social 
organization. The small scale compounded by limited resources renders the management 
method of the organization inevitably primitive and backward. However, as an exception, 
ICO has successfully broken this bottleneck and the reach of its activities has expanded all 
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across the coastline of China. This exception does not come out of nowhere, but finds its 
explanation in the global context of CSR movement, which has already been discussed in 
the third chapter. 
The expanding scale posed a challenge to ICO in terms of the management effectiveness 
that most of social organizations in China would not worry too much about. The increase in 
funding made it possible for ICO to aggrandize its organization to meet the need of 
increasing number of activities that ICO was carrying out simultaneously. This requires an 
overall adjustment of the management system including governance structure, financial 
management and human resources management. 
I. Governance structure 
Governance structure might be a misnomer to refer to the management system of ICO at 
the time of its founding, since the small scale of the organization did not require more than 
an informal management framed in a formal structure. Line and administrative staff 
overlapped, as the line service was rather simplistic and the administrative work associated 
with it was according singular. However, as a sign of a modem governance structure, ICO 
did have a board of directors when founded. This structural trait belies Liu's strategic 
vision for ICO at the very outset, for the board was there to actively network and search for 
resources on behalf of the organization. Initially, the board consisted of four directors, one 
from media and two from business sector (one of them is Liu's wife), Liu himself excluded. 
This was the leadership that guided the first three years of ICO's operation. 
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Obviously, the fast pace of ICO's development caused a tension in its informal governance 
structure, which led to a crisis associated with a scandal that put Liu's personal reputation 
in serious jeopardy in the summer of 2004. This research will not slice into the details of 
this crisis, which presents another limitation of this research. But it suffices to say here that 
the crisis brought to light the managerial disorder that was getting so critical that a massive 
overhaul would be needed to set ICO back on the right track. 
Ill fact, although ICO had always been aware of the deficiency in its management, its will 
to change was severely curbed by the lack of expertise as well as by so many projects with 
which ICO was preoccupied. However, the Winrock China NGO capacity building 
program starting from 2003 provided exactly the professional know-how in management 
that ICO was in dire need of. 
This NGO capacity building program was an initiative that Ford Foundation took to 
enhance the growth of NGOs in China. Financed by Ford Foundation, the program was 
actually carried out by the Winrock International Agricultural Development Center, a 
strategic partner with Ford Foundation in China. Winrock is a non-for-profit organization 
headquartered in the US with a mission to improve people's life and health around the 
world. Winrock has its presence in over 40 countries, specializing in agriculture, forest, 
natural resources management, clean energy, and leadership capacity development. The 
capacity building program was intended to help NGOs optimize the use of resources, exert 
internal control, handle public relation in the hope that NGOs could enhance problem 
solving and implementation skills, improve on accountability to donors and program 
111 
sponsors, and overcome legal barrier and hostile environment. The program took the form 
of periodic workshops designed specially for the several NGOs that were invited to 
participate in the program. In October, a team from Winrock visited ICO, evaluated its 
operation, and specified the areas that needed training. 
Guided by the Winrock program, in November 2004，ICO started implementing its 
corrective measures to reconfigure the governance structure. The administrative staff were 
separated from the line departments and reshuffled into a single administration and finance 
department. The line staff was restructured into three separate departments in charge of 
research and advocacy, community college, and CSR consultation, respectively. Within 
each line departments, the working team was the basic unit of operation. The four 
departments were supervised by a management committee, filled with department heads 
and chaired by Liu Kaiming. In its turn, the management committee was directly 
accountable to the board directors that expanded in 2004. Table shows the governance 
structure after the reform. 
The objectives that ICO desired to achieve by this reform are not different from the much 
sought-out ones in the business sector: efficiency, transparence and accountability. For a 
business, they are necessary for the sake of profitability, but for ICO, these objectives are 
the selling points whereby it could attract international funding, because an efficient, 
transparent and accountable management is a credible certificate that will make the donor 
believe in ICO's capacity to optimize the funds and accomplish the projects. 
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II. Financial management 
The difficulty associated with the financial management was critical for ICO in the first 
stage of its development. The correct strategy that ICO took raised a considerable fund 
from foreign NGOs and corporations. On the one hand, these funds fueled the growth of 
the organization; on the other, it challenged the ICO's capacity of managing these funds, 
which would ultimately dampen the donors' interest in the organization. ICO was like a 
rope under great tension pulled from two different directions, and in any minute, it was 
getting one step closer to a break. In June 2004, the break ultimately happened. One of the 
ICO employees sent emails to many ICO's donors and partners, accusing Liu of his 
negligence and managerial incapability, and implicated Liu in a scandal of fund 
embezzlement. This dramatic event dealt a huge blow to the organization. Based on the 
accusation, UC Berkeley, the biggest fund provider for ICO, sent for an investigation team 
to Shenzhen in July and conducted an audit on ICO's management of the community 
college project exclusively financed by UC Berkeley. The investigation submitted the 
report that confirmed the managerial risk involved in the project and UC Berkeley decided 
to terminate the funding of the project. The impact could have been deadly for ICO. Given 
that 60% of the 2004 annual budget was from community college project and 70% of ICO 
employees were working on this project, it was anything but difficult to recognize the 
gravity of the situation after UC Berkeley terminated the funding. 
In June 2004, owing to the scandal, Winrock made an ad hoc attempt to delegate Yu Yaohui, 
an auditing expert, to ICO to conduct an in-depth evaluation on ICO's financial capacity. 
Yu, financial controller at Oxfam Hong Kong, assessed the ICO's accounting regulations 
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and funding management system, and made a proposal of improvement. In October, Yu 
made his second visit to ICO, and based on the previous proposal, he led a fast track 
training program for the finance department employees. 
It was not until November 2004 that Winrock started its formal financial management 
training program at ICO. Thomas Leung, a financial management expert from Canada, 
came to ICO, began a two-day research on ICO's financial management system, and came 
up with a systematic solution. From February 2005, Leung conducted a training program 
featuring a revisit on the community college case in 2004 and the formulation of the annual 
operational plan 2005. The training helped the financial staff and the leadership to learn to 
apply the modern corporate accounting methods in both daily management and 
formulation of the annual operational plan, to implement cost reduction measures, and to 
lower operational risk. At the same time, ICO's financial staff took part in several seminars 
on financial management sponsored by the Winrock in 2004 and 2005. These training 
programs turned out very effective in improving the performance of ICO's financial 
management. The new accounting system made the organization's financial status quite 
transparent, which facilitated the project managers to promptly base their decisions on 
financial data. Monthly fmancials were immediately sent to the board and all line 
departments where managers and employees could all have a knowledge of the financial 
status of each department and the organization as whole. In October 2005, Winrock sent Yu 
Yaohui back to ICO for a reevaluation of the reformed financial management system. The 
four-day investigation comprised of fmancials auditing and staff interview returned a 
satisfactory result. 
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III. Human resources 
Human resources had always been a headache of ICO's leadership. Prior to 2004, ICO only 
had 12 full time employees in charge of a variety of activities ranging from conducting 
researches to CSR consulting. The founding of the community college brought an instant 
demand for more people, which led to an expansion of workforce from March to July 2004. 
However, poor human resources management planted the seed of the crisis that took place 
in June 2004. As Liu admitted, the increase in the number of projects to which ICO was 
committed simultaneously hurled the organization into a stage of "unconscious expansion", 
where the demand for people to fill up the vacancies became so overwhelming that little 
attention was paid to effective recruitment screening, performance assessment and 
on-the-job training. To compound the situation, ICO's leadership was short of business 
expertise to establish human resources management system in preparation for the 
organizational future growth. 
The Winrock program provided ICO with a systematic training on human resources 
management. In April 2005, Winrock held a workshop on human resources management 
for China's NGOs. Guided by the workshop, ICO began to pilot its plan for pooling a team 
of volunteers working for the organization. The plan featured a development of channels 
from which ICO would regularly recruit its volunteers and detail out a training procedure 
for them. In June, ICO accepted the first batch of volunteers from Colby University and 
Calvin University, the United States. They worked in the research department as translator 
and teachers in the community college. 
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In July 2005, Winrock sent two human resources consultants to ICO to provide a three-day 
training on the staff planning, management and training for volunteers. The training led to 
the adoption of a three-tier volunteer recruitment structure. The first tier focuses on the 
recruitment of professional volunteers who specialize in research and training. The second 
tier is social volunteer recruitment, and their volunteer work in the ICO is mainly 
professional services such as legal consulting and auditing. The third tier recruits migrant 
worker volunteers. 
C. Enterprises 
Workplace despotism is a widely researched topic among scholars of China's industrial 
relations in the reform era. '^'This is especially true of the export-or ientated industry that 
concentrates along the Southeastern coastline. As discussed in Chapter Four, the reason 
that accounts for the poor labor environment is the structure of international supply chains 
embedded in the MNC's production system. By outsourcing production process to 
factories in developing countries, MNCs want to take advantage of their cheap labor for the 
sake of cost reduction. The impact that the extensive outsourcing practice has on the labor 
is disastrous, in that it creates a market of suppliers where fierce competition drives the 
production cost to the minimal level in order to secure production orders from their TNC 
clients. Given the already low profit margin common to this sector, the only possible 
method to curb on the production cost is to squeeze it out of the labor. This is exactly why 
industrial conflicts frequently arises in the South China, since inhuman labor practices such 
101 See Anita China, China's workers under assault: the exploitation of labor in a globalizing economy, (Armonk, N.Y.: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2001); Lee King Kwan, From Organized Dependence to Disorganized Despotism: Changing Labor 
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as long working hours, poor working environment, physical abuse and wage delay, to name 
but a few, fueled the anger of the workers. 
The global CSR movement, however, has added to the economic essence of supply chain 
an element of moral conscience. The MNCs，supply chain is no longer merely a production 
process reengineering motivated by sheer profit making but also a process subject to public 
moral supervision. The fact that MNCs are taking initiatives to enforce codes of conduct in 
their suppliers is supposed to lead to the improvement, more or less, in labor practice, 
because the suppliers are rather sensitive to MNCs' demand. The reason is straightforward. 
Suppliers feed on M N C s production orders. 
In the case of ICO, it has been quite successful in securing a role in incorporating the 
China's suppliers into the CSR framework. ICO sponsored workshops that aimed to inform 
China's sourcing factories of the development of CSR and preach its importance in the 
global context. These efforts did bring factories to seek for further training assistance from 
ICO. In July 2004, Esquel Textile Company invited ICO to lead a training session to its 
CSR and HR department staff. Esquel, one of the largest textile manufacturers and 
exporters around the world, have factories all across China. Its Foshan branch factory alone 
has 20,000 workers, producing products for major international brands such as Nike, 
Reebok, Hugo Boss and Calvin Klein. In the same month, CSR managers from Xingpeng 
Company approached ICO and invited it to run its community college training in their 
Dongguan factory. Xingpeng is a major supplier for a variety of international brands such 
as Reebok, Timberland, Rockport, Polo, Nike, and Colehaan. In its Dongguan factory 
Regimes in Chinese Factories, The China Quarterly, No. 157. (Mar., 1999)，pp.44-71 
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alone, there are around 30,000 workers. ICO sent a team to Xingpeng and conducted 
surveys and interviews with workers and management. Based on the analysis of survey and 
interview results, ICO tailored a set of courses on communication skills, personal hygiene, 
occupational safety and health. The training lasted for two and a half months. 
Liu said that the management welcomed the presence of ICO in their factories conducting 
the training, since it helped harmonize the worker-management relations and enhance their 
productivity. However, this statement might partially be a rhetoric that Liu deployed to 
downplay the real motivation underlying suppliers' interest in cooperation with ICO. The 
fact that Nike was present in most of the workshops that ICO sponsored mirrors how CSR 
advocacy system works out. After all, suppliers are more likely to have interest in securing 
their orders from MNCs by improving their labor standards. 
D. Government 
For a marginalized interest social organization, its development is a process fraught with 
pitfalls and institutional constraints. From the first day when it comes into being, shortage 
ill funding represents a critical bottleneck in its operation. Activities have to be carefully 
chosen to accommodate their financial feasibility with the value in promoting the 
organization in the field. But these difficulties do not compare with the political risk that 
they take in their operation. Not very pronounced at the early stage of their development, 
political risk increases as the organization expands.^^^ Citation incomplete. Insofar as the 
102 For example, when the Democratic Party first emerged, the CCP did not give it much attention; however, as the 
Democratic Party got bigger, it became too conspicuous to evade state's monitoring. See Teresa Wright, China 
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social organization is merely committed to the services, usually welfare in nature and 
sometimes right protection in individual cases, the small scale of its activity is unlikely to 
confront official crackdown. On the contrary, these activities are often accepted by 
sympathetic government officials, and it is based on this informal approval that migrant 
worker social organizations are able to operate. However, this comparatively friendly 
environment does not obtain when the organization reaches certain level of scale. The 
increasing public clout commensurate with the expanding scale of the social organization 
leaves the government in a very uncomfortable situation where it has a good reason to start 
worrying about the danger that the tremendous mobilization power of the social 
organization poses to it. Liu was aware of this fact. 
Ill the history of ICO, the role of government was not clear-cut. Some sympathetic 
government officials in Shenzhen took some credit for ICO's establishment, since they 
advised Liu on feasible registration methods. Besides, an early project that ICO 
collaborated with the Shenzhen Statistical Bureau also indicated that government was 
friendly to spontaneous social organizations working for the minority interest groups such 
as migrant workers. Similarly, DSD also attributed part of its success to the assistance from 
the government, and it maintained a close relationship with the latter throughout its later 
development. However, this is not the case for ICO. 
ICO's stance towards government is unequivocal. Liu said that ICO had always tried to 
keep distance from the government. He rationalized this stance towards the government by 
alluding to the fact that this distance may help prevent ICO from being framed by the 
Democracy Party and the Politics of Protest 1980s 一 1990s, China Quarterly, 2003，172: 906-926 
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government, which became quite possible when ICO developed into a local NGO with 
nationwide reputation. However, this stance would not have worked out without another 
strategy that Liu took to proactively disabuse the government of any perception that ICO 
was involved in activities that could possibly threaten the 'national security'. Transparency, 
Liu said, was therefore extremely important. The logic behind is that on the one hand, ICO 
attempted to avoid government's participation in the operation of ICO, and on the other, 
ICO created easy access to information relating to its activities, partners and funding 
resources, facilitating the supervision of the government. This strategy turned out to be 
quite successful. 
But there did arise an incident where the action that government took mirrored the 
government's attitude towards spontaneous social organization. In September 2003，ICO 
made a move to establish a representative office in Shanghai in an effort to expand its 
presence to the Yangtze Delta Region centered on Shanghai. This was a strategic decision 
that ICO made to strengthen its network in North China coastline. The first stage of 
development for Shanghai office was to coach a research team to support ICO's research 
projects ill Yangtze Delta Region and North China coastline. Later, it was expected to help 
promote ICO's training and auditing services in those areas. This expansion strategy, if 
successful, would fulfill Liu's ambition to take ICO national wide. But no sooner had the 
office got established than the government placed a ban on it. The reason was not obscure. 
The existence of Shanghai office ran afoul of the government's time-honored logic 
underlying the provision in the regulations of social organizations, that is, the prohibition 
of the cross regional presence of social organizations could effectively limit their 
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mobilization power. 
Liu confessed that he was not unaware of this possibility, but he reasoned at that time that 
ICO registering as a business entity could possibly have a legitimate reason to set up a 
branch outside Shenzhen. After all, the legal regulations relating to social organizations did 
not apply to the practice of a business. In some sense, Liu's decision amount to be a testing 
of government's attitude towards social organizations, and the feedback he received was 
unfortunately negative. 
Overall, the government seems to be friendly to ICO as indicated by its non-interventionist 
stance towards the organization. This might be because CSR, although spurred by western 
civil society, has become more of a multinational corporation dominated processes. It is not 
reasonable for the government to meddle with the MNC's action to incorporate the CSR 
into their business strategy that requires a local CSR NGO sector to participate in the 
process. 
E. Trade Unions 
The presence of social organization such as ICO inevitably threatens the monopolistic 
position of the trade unions as a representative organization for the working class. However, 
the CSR movement that had fueled the growth of the NGO sector working in industrial 
relation leaves the trade union behind due to its official background. The situation seems to 
be disadvantageous for trade unions. The trade union's role in the workplace has been 
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undergoing shrinkage because of the reform that led to emergence of an enormous private 
sector comprised not only of foreign invested companies but of private-owned SMEs as 
well. This further marginalizes the unions in the industrial relations, as it has already 
suffered from the notorious double identity. In many private-owned enterprises, the unions, 
if being set up at all, are manipulated by the management, not to mention the fact that more 
often than not, they are not even existent in those enterprises. This might not have been a 
great concern for the trade unions, since there were no competitors. However, the rise of a 
CSR-orientated NGO sector as exemplified by ICO gave the official unions a good reason 
to worry. So, hypothetically, the unions would be uncomfortable with the presence of ICO. 
However, the real picture shows a bit more complicated pattern of responses from unions. 
The relations that ICO has with the trade unions displayed a contrasting variance. Overall, 
there is almost no contact between ICO and Shenzhen municipal unions or Guangdong 
provincial unions. There have been no projects that ICO collaborated with the latter two, 
and when I was approaching Shenzhen municipal unions for an interview, my contact gave 
me the feedback that the union official was extremely antipathetic towards ICO. 
Interestingly, ICO seems to have a rapport with unions outside Guangdong province. In 
Shanghai, Pudong District Union cosponsored with ICO in a CSR training project for 
union official and local enterprise management. In Jinan, the local municipal union assisted 
ICO in its training project in the city by arranging the training venues and publicizing the 
project among the local private sector. The hospitality of these unions contrasts sharply 
with the hostility of unions in Guangdong province towards ICO. 
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Liu said that personal connections helped ICO to win cooperation from unions in Shanghai 
and Jinan, but besides, an explanation from institutional perspective might be equally or 
even more important. The correlation between geography and union's attitude to ICO is not 
a coincidence, but rather a reflection of the competition that exists between trade unions 
and ICO. First, as aforementioned, CSR has become more of a multinational corporation 
initiated campaign that aims at improving labor standards in their supply chain located 
mainly in developing countries. While it was politically unwise before to be proactive in 
enforcing workplace labor standards, now unions could have played safe in the 
collaboration with the MNCs in the CSR projects and tried to be a real union without taking 
a huge political risk as it had done before. Unfortunately, the norm that global CSR 
involves local civil society dictates MNCs' pattern of strategy in China, meaning that trade 
unions could not share the expertise and resources regarding CSR, which comes mainly 
from MNCs and foreign NGOs. It then follows that ICO's physical presence and its 
pro-activeness in the region overshadowed the Guangdong unions. However, ICO does not 
have a branch in Shanghai, Jinan or anywhere else other than in Shenzhen, and their 
activities focus largely on Guangdong province, because of the setback in the 
establishment of Shanghai office. The threat was much less palpable to the unions outside 
Guangdong province. On the contrary, it was even beneficial for those unions to tap on the 
resources and expertise that ICO acquired from MNCs and foreign NGOs. Unions in 
Guangdong Province might have done the same, but there is a possible reason that prevents 
this win-win cooperation from happening. ICO's strategy of keeping itself distant from the 
government may also apply here as an explanation of why the attitudinal hostility exists on 
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the part of unions. For Liu, he would do whatever to fend off any possible tactics that 
unions would deploy to take ICO under its cover and subordinate ICO's leadership to its 
dictates, and therefore, avoiding local unions would be the safest strategy to follow. Second, 
the impact of certain union officials might also be crucial in explaining local unions' 
enmity to I C O， 
F. Summary 
I 
In this second phase of ICO's development, the organization successfully broke the 
bottleneck that troubled many marginalized interest social organizations in China. By 
establishing the reputation as an outstanding researcher in the field of Chinese migrant 
laborers, ICO fulfilled its objective to attract funding from MNCs and foreign NGOs so 
that it could expand its activities. Moreover, ICO also benefited from the management 
expertise of foreign NGOs. However, an obstacle manifested itself when ICO took a 
calculated move to found a Shanghai office. Obviously, this move trespassed the bottom 
line of the state's tolerance for the development of civil society. 
One of my contacts attempted to help me arrange an interview with one Shenzhen union official on the issue of ICO, 
but the official seemed to be quite extremely contemptuous towards ICO. He simply dismissed ICO as an organization 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
The experience of ICO in its first four years of development carries with it important 
messages of a possible transition in the Chinese labor regime that is prodded by the 
emerging CSR practices promoted and imposed by MNCs and western civil society in the 
China's export manufacturing sector. In turn, this possible transition helps shed light on the 
China's transitional state-society relations in general. To some extent, the state monopoly 
of industrial relations seems to have been impaired by the penetration of a NGO sector. 
This change comes about in the context of a sweeping market reform that has been 
underway for almost three decades. The reform has reinvigorated the society that had been 
almost completely subject to the state's dictates, which was made possible by the 
establishment of grassroots party institutions that dissolved spontaneous social bonds and 
traditions. The emergence of a NGO sector in the industrial relations is exactly a product of 
the revival of the society, but more importantly, it is the CSR ideology that figures in its 
growth. However, its actual development features a more complicated contextual pattern 
and a dynamic system that shaped its development trajectory. 
This chapter concludes the thesis by explicating the key variables that figure in the 
development of social organizations like ICO and may help refine a theoretical framework 
for the transitional labor regime in the context of CSR, which will, in turn, also shed light 
on the state-society relations transition. The first part revisits the cross-dilemma that state 
faces with respect to the civil society. It is in the context of this cross dilemma that the 
evolvement of civil society is further defined by the interactive processes between other 
that receives funding from western countries and thus as unreliable. 
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players, and therefore, the second part of this chapter recaps how these interactive 
processes have been unfolding in the context of CSR, and sums it up with a refined 
theoretical framework of the transition of labor regime and state-society relations in China. 
A. State and Civil Society: A Game of Push and Pull? 
In a sense, the NGO sector in China has always been fighting for its growth ever since the 
inception of the reform. From the initial frantic boom of student-led civil society 
movements that kept springing up in the 1980s, to the more practical-minded and 
strategically flexible development of civil society, the NGO sector has been engaging in a 
learning process. Like a classic medieval duel, after the violent exchange of gambits, the 
one of the fencers who gets seriously injured but not completely defeated begins to adjust 
its strategy by backing off to an extent to which it is possible for him to inch his way back 
once again through continual testing of its foe's stance. This analogy depicts very well the 
relationship between the state and civil society that evolved into the 1990s and 2000s, but 
with only a minor incongruence with the reality. While the fencers are bound to kill their 
opponents to put the duel to a close, the state and civil society are not looking for a closure 
of the duel but for a constantly changing equilibrium where they both benefit from their 
codependence. 
This codependence contrasts pronouncedly to the thesis put forward by Tang Tsou in his 
cultural analysis of the failure of political movement in 1989.^ ®'^  Tsou attributed the tragic 
104 See Tsou Tang, China's politics in twentieth century: From the perspective of macro history and micro actions 
(ershishiji zhongguo zhengzhi: cong hongguan lishi yu weiguanxingdu de jiaodu kan), (Hong Kong Oxford University 
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event to the fact that Chinese politics had always been hemmed in an illusory "either-or" 
scenario where you either win all, or you lose everything. Tsou had no difficulty in 
pinpointing students' radical moves aimed at embarrassing the major political leaders and 
pushing them to the edge. They were testing the limit of political leadership's tolerance by 
compelling a fall from grace. Unfortunately but not surprisingly，their strategy backfired. 
Obviously, the zero-sum mentality embedded deeply in Chinese political culture 
accelerated the campaign to its demise, as Tsou argued. However, this was not a demise of 
civil society in China, but the demise of a pattern of interaction between the state and civil 
society that characterized the 1980s. 
As a constituent part of state-society relations, the field of industrial relations has exactly 
witnessed the politics of the codependent relationship between the state and society. The 
state seeks to tap on the social resources to ameliorate the impoverishment of migrant 
workers who are being exploited to finance the export-oriented industrialization, while the 
NGOs depend on the state's tolerance and official channels for the sake of their operation 
and development. In the case of ICO, the role of state, though a bit elusive, still figured in 
some ways in the ICO's history. Being an NGO with a legal status as a business, ICO did 
depend on the government's acquiescent acceptance of the existence of such an anomaly, 
but on the other side of coin, the lack of government's countenance aborted ICO's 
expansion plan to set up a Shanghai office. 
B. A Western-Bred Civil Society? 
Press, 1994) 
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China's government has long been suspicious of the threat that a lurking western civil 
society was going to turn the Chinese society against it. Memory is still afresh about how 
the government accused the western countries of their agitating local "anti-revolutionaries" 
in the political turmoil of 1989. However, the door was finally opened in 1991 to western 
NGOs because of the disastrous flood that raged in that year, and the government deemed it 
financially desirable to tap on the relief resources that western NGOs could offer. Ever 
since, the western civil society incarnated in NGOs has begun to push their frontier into 
China, and it figured prominently in the recent development of a local NGO sector in the 
industrial relations, of which ICO presents a perfect example. 
The impact that western civil society has on the growth of a local NGO sector is both 
indirect and direct. Its indirect effect is mediated through the structure of international 
political economy of supply chains, a production network centered on MNCs. The western 
civil society pulled triggered on MNCs, pressuring them into taking actions about the 
abusive labor environment of their suppliers. This action of the western civil society 
brought with it a huge opportunity for a local NGO sector in China to grow. Since 
multiparty participation has already become a norm in the CSR enforcement, it was in 
MNCs' interest to breed a local NGO sector to be part of the CSR process so as to disabuse 
the public perception of CSR being a corporate-dominated sham. Moreover, the fact that 
MNCs have incorporated CSR into their business strategy has tremendously reduced the 
political risk that the local NGO sector takes in getting involved in the industrial relations. 
The reason is self-evident. On the one hand, the government has no reason to interfere with 
the MNCs' own business; on the other, the government does not want to see Chinese 
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enterprises lose their business due to the noncompliance with the codes of conduct. In some 
ways, through MNCs, the western civil society helped break the institutional barrier that 
had blocked the civil society from the state monopolized industrial relations. 
The direct effect of the western civil society is largely the funding it has channeled to the 
local NGO sector and the managerial expertise it has shared with it. For social 
organizations with no official background, money is always a critical constraint that stunts 
the growth of the organization. In the case ofICO, it is the funding from foreign NGOs that 
led to a rapid development of the organization. Besides, managerial expertise is also 
lacking in China's NGO sector. Of course, many small-scale NGOs with an informal 
management structure need not worry about how to manage the organization, because 
there is not much to be managed in the first place. However, the managerial issue becomes 
acute when organizational expansion is brought on the agenda. For ICO, the managerial 
incapability at tine of operational expansion even led to a crisis that had almost ruined its 
reputation. 
To note, this pattern of a western-bred NGO sector in the field of industrial relations seems 
hard to replicate in other arena of the civil society. The uniqueness of this case is the 
presence of MNCs in this process of civil society development, which makes the state lean 
toward an economic interpretation of it instead of a political one. This provides a freer hand 
to western NGOs in its support of a local NGO sector working in the industrial relations. 
However, for other arenas of marginalized interest in China, similar supportive actions on 
the part of foreign NGOs might readily bring the government on alert. This being said, 
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there is still room for western NGOs to channel resources to breed the fledging local social 
organizations without governmental background in these social arenas, certainly with more 
red-taping and caution. After all, the government would rather see the social burden being 
shouldered by the society than leaving it untendered until it ferments trouble. But the 
state's tolerance to this pattern of western-bred civil society seems to sit on the presence of 
another player: the social entrepreneurs. 
C. The Social Entrepreneurs 
Social entrepreneur is a term that has recently been quite popular in the literatures. Social 
entrepreneur is used to describe the type of social activists engaged in the social activities 
with an entrepreneurial approach. In order to achieve the social objective, social 
entrepreneur is concerned not only of how to achieve it, but also of how to achieve it 
effectively, efficiently and economically. In the case of ICO, Liu represents a good 
example of what a social entrepreneur is supposed to be. Liu had a clear vision for the 
direction that ICO would be headed for at the time of ICO's founding. He deemed CSR 
practices as a desirable channel to raise necessary funds to fuel the organizational 
expansion. So, from Day One, Liu was trying to lead ICO to be a player in the field of CSR 
by strategic planning. Given Liu's intellectual background (as a Ph.D degree holder, he 
worked at a local newspaper before he founded ICO) and the many other cases where 
intellectuals such as university professors are leading social initiatives for minority 
interests, it is necessary to consider the intellectual-turned social entrepreneurs as a 
variable that affects the development of social organization in the industrial relations, and 
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more generally, the transition of state-society relations. However, it would be necessary to 
capture the role that intellectuals have played in the history of PRC before turning to a 
discussion of social entrepreneurs. 
Intellectual's role in the development of China's civil society is a topic that warrants a 
separate thesis, since intellectuals are themselves a constituent part of the civil society, and 
a critical one. Pertaining to this research of the transition in industrial relations is the 
cross-class alliance between intellectuals and migrant workers in a cause to improve the 
rights condition of the latter. However, it is necessary to clarify that the nature of this 
cross-class alliance is a social entrepreneur-dominated one. In the case study that this 
research features, migrant workers were not part of the ICO at the time of its founding. The 
organization was completely a product of several intellectuals' collective effort. Migrant 
workers are merely the recipients of the benefits that ICO brought to them. Recall the 
history of labor activism since the republican China, the current labor passivity presents a 
sharp contrast. Unlike the urban workers who had weathered the socialist ups and downs 
and become a seasoned wrestler in the political game with the state, the vast majority of 
peasant-turned migrant laborers who got uprooted from the village are not only poorly 
resourced in the urban area, but also hardly identified with each other. To top it off, their 
agrarian pacificism, more pronounced among migrant maiden workers who constitute a 
bulk of migrant workers, makes this newly emerging working class much less political and 
conscious of their rights which, however, got frequently quoted by the urban proletariat in 
their treacherous play with the state. 
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In some ways, this tamed mindset of migrant laborers figures critically in making possible 
its alliance with the intellectuals, which had seldom materialized ever before. The 
inter-class competition between the intellectuals and the workers is no longer existent as it 
has been throughout the PRC history of social movements. However, this labor passivity is 
far from being a sufficient reason for this emergence of an intellectual dominated alliance 
with the working class. The explanation should also be found in the attitudinal change in 
the intellectuals. 
With different backgrounds, intellectuals and workers make up two separate social forces 
in social movement, informed of distinctive agenda and struggling for particular causes. 
This is exactly the reasoning behind part of Perry's explanation of the insulation between 
intellectuals and workers where the former had a disdain for the latter whose aspirations 
were frequently dismissed as economist. ^^ ^ This "economist" mentality remains 
unchanged even though the working class has weathered a reshuffling in its composition. 
For migrant workers, they are far from being concerned with their political rights, but 
rather they do feel indignant for being cheated on the issue of payment. Of course, several 
educated migrant workers might be aware of the notion of independent unionism, but the 
vast fellow workers know little about that, leave alone to fight for it. The several riots that 
erupted in Dongguan were without exception stirred up by the employers' blatant default 
on workers' w a g e s . T h e n , the question is why the economism of the working class did 
not prevent the emergence of the cross-class alliance now. The answer would be an 
attitudinal shift among intellectuals from the Confucian identification with the state to the 
See Perry, p.83 
See note 95 
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grassroots orientated populism. 
For Chinese intellectuals, the Confucian culture tends to instill into them a sense of 
responsibility for the state. This identification was of course institutionalized in the 
examination system, as the highest honor for a Confucian scholar was to win official 
position by an outstanding examination performance.'®^ The 1989 political crisis saw 
exactly the manifestation of this psychology of the Chinese intellectuals. While the 
students snubbed the supportive workers in their campaign, they staged one drama after 
another imploring the government to treat them fairly and take their political appeal 
seriously. However, this statist mentality of the intellectuals seems to have been gradually 
replaced by a grassroots oriented populism after the radical bloodshed of 1989. Like Liu 
Kaiming and his colleagues, intellectuals begin to be engaged in a conscience-driven effort 
to protect the marginalized interest such as labor. 
Indeed, the explanation of such an attitudinal change of intellectuals is out of scope for this 
research, but it suffices here to mention the two possible reasons. First, the coiporatist 
structure aimed to control the intellectuals was also found to have shielded the intellectuals 
from the negative impact of market reform. So, the intellectuals are themselves the winner 
of the reform, which arouses their responsibility for the disadvantaged social classes. 
Second, the direct confrontation with the state was a lesson that intellectuals have learnt in 
the experiences of the 1980s. Focusing on political issues was not a viable path to bringing 
about changes. Instead, social issues might be a safer agenda to pursue as an effort to effect 
� 7 See Timothy Cheek, From Priests to Professionals: Intellectuals and the State under the CCP, in Jeffrey N. 
Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J Perry (eds.), Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China, (Westerview Press, 
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gradualist changes. In other words, the intellectuals found it viable to work on social issues 
where a strategic equilibrium with the state is deemed as attainable. This is exactly the 
feature of social entrepreneurs. 
The merits of this intellectual-tiimed social entrepreneur-led civil society are quite evident. 
First, they are in possession of a close network with government officials, which provides 
them with an informal channel for lobbying for their agenda and renders any radical 
movement unnecessary. Second, they are capable of employing innovative strategies in the 
bargaining process with the state. As the state sets up regulatory frameworks that aims to 
guide the development of a civil society in a way that does not threaten its rule，and makes 
revision to correct the irregularities, the civil society led by intellectual-turned social 
entrepreneurs is able to take calculated actions within the legal framework and to move 
back and forth based on the feedbacks that it receives from the state. In the case of ICO, Liu 
and several other cofounders all had an official background at the time of the organization's 
establishment, and their government contacts helped in the process leading to the ICO's 
registration. On the issue of the organizational expansion, although the establishment of a 
Shanghai office confronted the state's veto, the decision was itself a well reasoned 
maneuver with certain level of risk, of which Liu was not unaware. In a nutshell, social 
entrepreneurs are in a position to take strategic actions in their development, based on their 
capacity to exchange information with state. 
D. Refining the Theoretical Framework of Transformation in Chinese Labor Regime 
and State-Society Relations 
1994) 
134 
Based on the previous discussion of the two key variables in the change that has taken 
place in the labor regime, namely, western civil society and intellectual-turned social 
entrepreneurs, a theoretical framework could be derived to guide the understanding of this 
unfolding process. The framework features a dynamic system that has fueled the growth a 
NGO sector in the field of industrial relations. In this dynamic system, the role of 
intellectuals-turned social entrepreneur is critical in steering the growth of the NGO sector 
by tapping on the resources from foreign NGOs combined with official networks. This 
capability of the intellectual-turned social entrepreneur is derived from their noncommittal 
connection with the state due to the corporatist structure that the state has relied on to exert 
control on intellectuals. Although many social entrepreneurs have seceded from those 
corporatist institutions, their connection with the government remains. This connection 
provides the very foundation of the strategic interactions between the players in the labor 
regime. 
The western civil society presents the next key player in the labor regime. Its financial 
resources and expertise are the most sought-after resources for the local NGOs. However, 
the extent to which western civil society could channel its resources into China's NGOs 
such as ICO depends exactly on western NGOs' strategic interaction with the state and 
most importantly on the existence of a political risk reduction mechanism. In the case of 
industrial relations, the political risk reduction mechanism is the global ideology of CSR 
embodied in the domination of MNCs in the CSR practices. 
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Pressurized by western civil society, MNCs were prompted to take actions to deal with 
exploitative labor practice in their suppliers As MNCs have incorporated into their 
business strategy the participation of the civil society in the enforcement of labor standards, 
they are in need of a local NGO sector tutored and supported by their western counterparts 
which have the expertise in the CSR field. So, the political connotation that the western 
civil society has in nurturing a local one in China is reduced by the imperative business 
demand. Moreover, the presence of MNCs is also critical in the sense that it tears down the 
barrier of enterprises that migrant worker social organizations are not able to overcome on 
their own in the process of labor rights protection in the workplace. For enterprises, it is the 
maximization of profit that drives them to implement exploitative labor practice, and by no 
means would they be friendly to NGOs that attempt to temper with it. However, MNCs are 
in a position to enlist the suppliers' compliance to open their doors to the NGOs. 
Besides the intellectuals and western civil society as the two key variables, another 
variable also requires due attention. The trade unions seem to be losing its state mandated 
power to monopolize the representation of the working class. The marginalization of trade 
unions in the context of CSR movements is caused by its official background, since the 
global CSR practice requires the participation of an independent third party from the civil 
society, whereas trade unions in China could hardly steer clear of its attachment to the 
government. 
Based on this framework that helps understand the change unfolding in the labor regime, a 
general theoretical framework can be derived to guide the understanding of the 
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development of Chinese state-society relations. Just as the change of labor regime, 
intellectual-turned social entrepreneurs and western civil society represent two of the most 
important actors in the evolvement of state-society relations. However, the extent to which 
these two actors could form a close strategic ally in steering the growth of China's civil 
society is dependent on the presence of a political risk reduction factor. In the case of 
industrial relations, it is the presence of MNCs in the enforcement of CSR-informed labor 
standards that facilitated a collaboration of local NGOs with western NGOs. In the arenas 
of other marginalized social interests, the emergence of a political risk reduction factor will 
open the window for the collaboration of Chinese intellectuals with the western civil 
society. The case of AIDS victims in Henan province might provide a rough evidence to 
corroborate the way the political risk reduction factor works to facilitate the strategic 
partnership between foreign NGOs and Chinese intellectuals. 
Lastly, it is necessary to note that the two theoretical frameworks do not present an 
overarching explanatory instrument to the transition of labor regime and civil society 
development. They capture an important part of the transition of Chinese labor regime and 
civil society, but the extent to which they are relevant has yet to been seen. Further 
researches might be needed to map out the whole picture where the frameworks derived 
from my research could be embedded. 
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